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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW 
 
Globalisation, defined as an increasingly integrated world economy, has the potential to 
generate the largest structural upheaval in economies since the industrial revolution. As in the 
past, this process is being underpinned by both technological change and by a shift in policies 
in many countries towards a more open, market based, system of economic governance. 
These policies reflect the realities of a new world order where knowledge creation and 
absorption and the flexibility of the regulatory and institutional frameworks will be the key 
determinants of the economic fortunes of economies. 
 
While the process itself is not new, the present phase of this secular globalisation process has 
witnessed a significant acceleration over the last 1-2 decades, with the integration of China, 
India and the former USSR countries into the world economy. This acceleration in integration 
has resulted in a 50% increase in the world’s non-agricultural labour force, with a large 
proportion of these additional 700 million workers comparing well in human capital terms 
with the low skilled workers of the “developed” world. This labour supply boost has also 
coincided with a period rich in technological progress, most notably in the ICT area, with 
positive effects from the sharp reduction in communication costs being reflected in the 
growing tradeability of many traditionally sheltered service sectors.  
 
This dramatic intensification of the globalisation process is already transforming the 
economic structures of the developed and developing worlds, with India emerging as a global 
power in services, China consolidating its position in manufacturing and with the developed 
world as a whole searching for an appropriate response. 
 
Many countries in the developed world have recognised the seismic nature of the change and 
are responding positively by embracing an open-economy, innovation-based, model which 
emphasises the importance of world class educational establishments; higher levels of, 
excellence driven and better targeted, R&D; more market based financing systems; and the 
need for a range of policies aimed at delivering a more dynamic and competitive business 
environment. Others are responding in an inappropriate manner by attempting to cling to the 
belief that the EU’s present economic problems are temporary and that the magnitude of the 
changes wrought by globalisation does not justify the need for fundamental reforms.  
 
What are the basic questions to be answered about globalisation : The present study tries 
to answer the following :  
 
•  Firstly, what differentiates the present globalisation phase from previous patterns ? 
 
•  Secondly, while the longer term gains from deeper levels of worldwide integration 
predicted by many commentators are not questioned, could the short term adjustment 
costs for specific sectors and skill groups (in terms of restructuring costs and real wage 
changes) be more severe and endure for longer, given the scale and nature of the 
present globalisation phase ? 
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•  Thirdly, does the empirical evidence regarding globalisation over the period 1990-
2003 suggest a positive or negative interpretation regarding the effects of such 
phenomena as global relocation; the threat of China; changes in international R&D 
patterns; shifts in terms of trade movements; and divergences in productivity and GDP 
per capita trends ? 
 
•  Fourthly, in terms of quantifying the macro benefits and costs for the EU over the 
coming decades, what can our globalisation model, on the basis of unchanged policies, 
tell us about the static and dynamic effects of the post-1990 phase of globalisation and 
its overall impact on EU living standards up to 2050 ? 
 
•  Finally, in terms of policy conclusions, what are the lessons to be drawn in terms of 
the EU’s overall approach to globalisation and why does the present analysis suggest 
that the Lisbon strategy’s emphasis on the knowledge economy must be a critical 
element in any effective policy response ?   
 
What broad insights does the analysis provide regarding globalisation in general ? : The 
key points to emerge from the analysis are as follows : 
 
•  The post-1990 globalisation phase is characterised by three key interrelated 
phenomena which differentiate it from previous phases stretching back to the 1850’s : 
firstly, an unprecedented deepening in trade and capital market integration; secondly, 
a cost-induced and ICT-enabled acceleration in the worldwide relocation of 
production processes, with an associated boost to trade in intermediate goods and 
services; and finally, regarding the developing world, higher trade and capital flows 
coupled with strong human capital endowments are driving a steady process of global 
income and technological convergence.  
 
•  Regarding the short and long term effects of globalisation, even if one holds the 
consensus view that globalisation will be welfare improving in the long run, one 
should not ignore the existence of short run, negative effects from globalisation for 
economically advanced regions such as the EU. Such effects should however be 
interpreted as transition costs, linked with induced changes in specialisation which 
inevitably must occur to ensure that globalisation is a mutually enriching experience.  
 
•  Whilst inevitable, the transition costs may be relatively severe for individual EU 
sectors and skill groups given the size of the global supply shock which has occurred; 
the fact that skill levels for the new entrants to the world’s labour force are relatively 
high; that traditionally protected service sectors are affected; and that the EU’s 
production and trade structures have a substantially higher share of low and medium-
low technology products compared with both the US and Japan, with the adjustment 
costs potentially higher therefore than in the past in terms of shifts in the 
unemployment rates / compensation levels of lower-skilled workers.  
 
•  Despite these valid concerns at the sectoral / skill level, the net effects at the macro 
level should not be exaggerated. Many commentators erroneously focus on the highly 
visible localised losses (which are often highly concentrated) rather than the less 
visible, but real, macroeconomic gains which are dispersed widely and are enjoyed by   5
the population as a whole
1. In addition, these short-run transition costs should be kept 
in perspective given firstly, the once-off nature of these costs, compared with the 
permanent gains from restructuring; secondly, since extra-EU activities constitute a 
relatively small share of total EU output (i.e. less than 18%
2); and finally, the fact that 
the duration and intensity of the costs will only become problematic in circumstances 
where policy makers fail to respond appropriately
3.  
 
•  While it is accepted that there will be winners and losers, this study shows clearly that 
when all the effects are properly accounted for, that the transition costs are in fact 
relatively small (less than 0.1 off the growth rate of EU living standards over the 
period 1991-2003), with offsetting effects on consumers and producers  :  
  
o  On the consumption side, the downward pressure on consumer prices from 
cheaper imports has contributed to a doubling in the growth rate of real 
consumption wages over the 1990’s in the EU (and in the US). This 
globalisation-linked increase in the consumer surplus has also been bolstered 
by the gains accruing from a significant increase in product varieties.  
   
o  On the production side, while the EU is holding its own in export markets both 
in terms of volumes and prices, domestically globalisation is being reflected in 
higher import penetration rates, increased net FDI outflows and a faster pace of 
external outsourcing of goods and services, all of which are potentially 
negative in the short run.  
 
•  While an examination of the short run empirical evidence for the period 1991-2003 is 
elucidating, it is nevertheless only partial in nature, with the paper’s most important 
contribution being its ability to offer a, no-policy change, general equilibrium 
assessment of the benefits and risks of globalisation over the total period 1991-2050. 
This is done using an open economy macro model which has been adapted to take 
account of the post-1990 empirical evidence regarding the various transmission 
channels. Apart from the income and terms of trade effects linked to shifts in 
international specialisation, these channels include enhanced levels of competition; 
increased incentives for investment and innovation; the diffusion of new technologies 
and organisational practices; scale economies; and greater efficiencies in terms of 
resource allocation.    
 
                                                 
1 According to an article by G. Hufbauer and P. Grieco in the Washington Post in 2005, the adjustment costs are small compared with the 
gains : "We estimate that the lifetime costs of a year's worth of trade-related job losses (for the US) is roughly $54 billion, about €240000 per 
affected worker. This is a huge loss on a personal level but only about 5% of the annual national gains from liberalisation". The authors also 
stress that while the losses are transitory, the gains from trade liberalisation are permanent. Consequently, there is a strong prima facie case to 
compensate the losers from liberalisation (eg in the import-competing industries) since the net gains for the economy as a whole are so large. 
2 One measure of the trade openness of a country is the average of imports and exports (goods and services) at current prices as a % of GDP. 
Using this definition the extra-EU15 trade-to-GDP ratio was 17.9% in 2003 compared with a figure of 11.9% for the US and 11% for Japan. 
While the degree of EU openness has increased since the early 1990's, one should keep the overall level in perspective. 
3 In addition, as the 2005 OECD Employment Outlook rightly stresses, the size of the labour market challenge should not be exaggerated : 
"Only a fraction of job losses recorded in OECD countries is likely to be directly attributable to trade and investment liberalisation. To 
illustrate this, data for 15 OECD countries over the period 1900-2000 show that the high import competition industries within manufacturing 
only accounted for 4 percent of total employment on average. ….The most important long run impacts of international trade and investment 
on labour markets have been to raise average real wages, while inducing shifts in the sectoral and occupational composition of employment. 
Neither economic policy nor the historical record suggests that the aggregate employment performance has been undermined by increased 
international economic integration. However, it is likely that growing trade with low-wage countries has played some role in increasing wage 
inequality in many OECD countries".   6
•  Using this specially constructed globalisation model, the paper quantifies the macro 
benefits and costs of growing worldwide integration for the EU’s economy, with the 
simulations leading to the following basic conclusions :  
 
o  The results of all the simulation experiments show that the short and long run 
static effects of globalisation are likely to be small. The emergence of the 
much larger dynamic benefits will be crucially dependent on policy makers 
facilitating, not hindering, the difficult process of EU restructuring which must 
occur. EU industries must learn to adapt to higher levels of global competition 
and to benefit from the TFP spillover effects of the innovations being 
generated elsewhere in the world.  
 
o  In terms of quantifying the gains, the simulations show that while the benefits 
of globalisation have been close to zero for the EU over the period 1990-2003, 
with effective restructuring the EU has the potential to reap a permanent, 
annual, income gain of 8% (i.e. €800 billion
4) or more over the next 50 years. 
 
o  Finally, given the extent of the adjustments to be made, it is hardly surprising 
that the present debate on globalisation is often tinged with protectionist 
rhetoric. The simulations suggest that the EU would lose significantly from a 
lurch towards more insular policies, with an anti-globalisation scenario 
predicting that long run real wages for EU workers would end up over 20% 
lower compared with their level in the most optimistic globalisation scenario. 
 
What conclusions are drawn regarding specific globalisation themes ?    
 
•  Global Production Relocation : Relocation is the general term used in the study to 
refer to the impact of outsourcing, offshoring and shifts in international demand 
patterns. On outsourcing, the empirical evidence over the period 1991-2003 is 
relatively favourable, with the EU increasing its net surplus with the rest of the world 
in terms of its trade in intermediate goods and services. Regarding offshoring, the 
picture is less reassuring with a noticeable increase in net outflows of FDI since the 
mid 1990’s. However, the amounts are not large as a share of the EU’s overall capital 
stock and there is evidence to suggest that at least a sizeable part of this net outflow is 
of a horizontal ("technology-sourcing") nature rather than the vertical, cost-driven, 
variety (the latter variety is normally deemed problematic by critics of globalisation). 
In terms of changes to global demand patterns, there is evidence to suggest that a shift 
in preferences has occurred towards non-EU produced products.  
 
•  On the basis of this empirical evidence on outsourcing, offshoring and shifts in 
demand patterns over the period 1991-2003, the model is calibrated to assess the 
overall short and long run effects of production relocation on EU living standards in 
both static and dynamic terms. In static terms (i.e. taking account only of the “first 
round” effects on consumers and firms) the globalisation model suggests that, even 
using some of the most pessimistic assumptions regarding production relocation
5, one 
                                                 
4 2004 prices. 
5 See Samuelson (2004)   7
arrives at long run effects on EU living standards of close to zero in both level and 
growth rate terms. When one also includes the dynamic effects of globalisation (i.e. 
general equilibrium effects which would be expected to kick into action once shifts in 
worldwide relocation patterns start to impact on the respective economic structures of 
countries) the EU gains in the long run from global relocation. These GDP per capita 
gains reflect the higher productivity growth rates which emerge over time due to a 
more efficient global division of labour. The size of the EU’s share of these worldwide 
efficiency gains will depend on the speed with which the necessary sectoral 
reallocation of resources takes place in the EU and, in particular, on the success of 
governments in facilitating this adjustment process. 
 
•  Trade integration & the threat of China : On China, the paper shows that the EU 
has a large and growing trade deficit with this emerging global giant. However, the 
EU’s overall trade balance with the world as a whole has improved over the 1992-
2003 period since it has been able to offset losses with China with gains elsewhere, 
with the result that its overall global trade performance has been much stronger than 
that of the US or Japan. In addition, the EU enjoys strong complementarities with 
China in terms of its trade structures, with the EU specialising in medium-high 
technology and capital goods, compared with China’s comparative advantage in low-
technology, labour intensive and ICT related products.  
 
•  In terms of future developments, while, on the basis of present trends, China is not 
likely to pose a serious technological threat to the EU, US or Japan over the next 1 to 
2 decades
6, the situation is changing fast, with China’s R&D intensity more than 
doubling over the period 1995-2003 to close to 1 ½ % of GDP. In addition, the EU 
must realise that part of its present good fortune is linked to the complementarity 
issue; to the fact that the present catching-up environment favours the EU’s 
specialisation in capital goods production and that it helps in terms of its external 
pricing power; and that China’s trade success so far has generally been in product 
areas, such as ICT, which are relatively unimportant from Europe's perspective 
compared with product categories such as cars, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. In this 
context, the recent revelation that 2005 marked the first year that China recorded a 
surplus on its trade in motor vehicles suggests that future trading conditions for 
European companies could become much more demanding.  
 
•  In terms of the simulations, the results suggest that the catching-up processes of large 
emerging economies such as China can be a mutually beneficial process, with strong 
per capita income gains for both the developed and developing world. Globalisation is 
most definitely not a zero sum game
7. 
                                                 
6 While China is undoubtedly getting the wage benefits of globalisation, it is not clear how much of the profits it is retaining. 
7  The notion of "zero sum" is linked with the erroneous belief that what is good for China must be bad for the EU. In fact trade is mutually 
advantageous as long as each country specialises in products where it has a comparative advantage and this is what appears to be happening 
at the moment in terms of EU-China trade patterns. According to Wolf (2004), the world should be somewhat relaxed about the threat of 
China. He tries to answer a number of questions which are typical of the popular debate on China (eg "How can workers in high-income 
countries compete with Chinese workers ? How can they find jobs when the ones they have go abroad ? How is the world going to avoid a 
glut of manufacturing capacity, with deflation and mass unemployment ?). He stresses that as long as the labour markets of the developed 
world can smoothly reallocate the displaced workers (at the moment mainly from manufacturing since it is becoming the new agriculture) 
then China does not pose a serious threat since : "First, an irresistibly competitive China is a figment of the fevered imagination, since the 
real cost of labour will tend to remain in line with its productivity. Second, the principal determinants of declining employment in 
manufacturing in the high-income countries have been sluggish demand and rapidly rising productivity, not trade. Third, even a dramatic 
impact on the terms of trade of high-income countries, via a huge rise in the relative prices of commodities, would have a modest impact on 
their real incomes. In short, worries about de-industrialisation and global competition from pauper labour are nonsense".    8
 
•  Changes in international R&D patterns : The last 15 years has witnessed a dramatic 
upward shift in the internationalisation of R&D flows, as well as in the geographical 
focus of those flows and in the innovation strategies of transnational corporations.  
This period has experienced a 40% increase in the share of total R&D spending which 
is spent abroad, with the traditional intra-Triad nature of this spending giving way to a 
more truly global pattern, with China and India becoming important locations for 
planned R&D investments. In addition, the overwhelmingly demand side (i.e. market 
driven) focus of R&D flows up to the mid-1980’s has increasingly given way to a 
more supply side, technology-seeking, motivation for setting up foreign research 
laboratories. This strategic shift is working in favour of the US, with the latter having 
a number of important locational advantages compared with the EU for attracting 
internationally mobile R&D flows focussed on technology sourcing. These advantages 
include unrivalled research and teaching institutions as well as a highly integrated 
innovation system which has a proven track record in nurturing centres of excellence 
and leading-edge technology clusters.  In overall terms, the US has increased its world 
share of total, internationally mobile, R&D expenditures from 45% in 1995 to nearly 
65% by the end of the decade. 
 
•  Shifts in Terms of Trade :  Terms of trade trends directly affect the real income 
positions of economies and since 1990 these trends tend to confirm the optimistic, 
mainstream, view of globalisation. If one looks at developments in export and import 
prices, excluding volatile oil products, the EU and especially the US have been 
gaining in terms of their pricing power at the expense of countries such as China. The 
evidence to date underlines the importance of moving up the value added chain, with 
the US gaining significantly from this strategy, with direct benefits in terms of the 
income positions of its citizens.  
 
•  Since they are such a crucial determinant of the overall gains and losses from 
globalisation, a range of possible scenarios for the evolution of the terms of trade are 
assessed in the simulations to 2050. These scenarios evaluate the effects of both a 
continuation of the present favourable terms of trade trends as well as analysing the 
implications if China and India directly challenge the US and the EU in their core 
medium-high to high-technology specialisations. Depending on the assumptions used 
regarding the degree of the shifts in specialisation, the simulations suggest that 
globalisation could lead to changes in the EU’s terms of trade over the coming 
decades ranging from zero to positive gains of over 10%. 
 
•  Worldwide Divergences in Productivity and GDP per capita growth rates : GDP 
per capita trends have been deteriorating in the EU relative to other OECD economies 
since the mid-1990’s, with any gains from the increases in EU employment rates 
which occurred over that time being more than offset by negative productivity trends. 
These developments are quite alarming given that a large number of other areas 
around the world, both developed and developing, have experienced a strong 
acceleration or positive turnaround in their productivity / GDP per capita 
performances, with trends in the latter being the ultimate indicators of the success or 
failure of their globalisation strategies. While it is difficult to disentangle the different 
influences, the present paper concludes that the EU's problems on the productivity / 
GDP per capita side are domestic in origin and consequently should not be attributed 
to the effects of global production relocation nor to the integration of China into the   9
world economy. In fact, it is argued that both of these latter developments are in the 
long run highly positive for EU productivity trends and living standards in general.  
 
What are the Key Messages to be retained by Policy Makers 
   
•  Firstly, globalisation has been highly beneficial for the EU in the past and can be 
equally so in the future. Over the post-war period, it allowed the EU to converge 
strongly towards US standards of living, with at least 20% of the gains in GDP per 
capita over this period directly linked to globalisation. Regarding more recent trends, 
the evidence over the period 1990-2003 suggests that the EU has not benefited from 
globalisation. Gains on the consumer side have been offset by losses on the production 
side, although the overall net GDP per capita effects have been relatively small (less 
than 0.1 off the growth rate of living standards). These modest losses should only be 
seen however as transition / restructuring effects, with greater levels of competition 
and TFP spillover effects confidently expected to lead to significant long run gains 
from globalisation. The simulations suggest the possibility of EU GDP per capita 
gains similar to those predicted for the EU's Single Market Programme. Exploiting the 
opportunities offered by the present globalisation phase could bring additional income 
gains of over €2000 annually, in 2004 prices, for every EU citizen (over €5000 per EU 
household). In addition, these estimated gains are based only on a "no policy change" 
assumption and on the effects of existing liberalisation measures. If a successful Doha 
round can be realised, substantially higher gains can be expected.  
 
•  Secondly, with globalisation leading to some questioning of established “stylised 
facts” in economics, such as the assumed constancy of wage / profit shares over time
8, 
policy makers need to remain responsive to the increased complexity. With 
multinationals doing a growing proportion of their business outside their “home” 
markets, the historically close correlation between profits and GDP growth (and the 
important second round effects of higher profitability on domestic investment, wages 
and employment growth) is fast becoming more problematic. Likewise, access to 
relatively cheap labour in emerging economies as well as the threat of relocation to 
such markets are key factors in the globalisation related strengthening of the wage 
bargaining power of companies. What are EU governments to do in these rapidly 
changing circumstances ? At a minimum, they need to look at innovative ways of 
increasing their attractiveness as locations for investment and employment creation; to 
equip their workers with the requisite skills and flexibility for effective survival and to 
maximise the consumer gains from globalisation by ensuring highly competitive 
domestic marketplaces. Policy must be focussed on maximising the domestic share of 
the global value added generated by internationally mobile companies and not on, 
ultimately futile, attempts to unfairly tax or restrict the operations of such companies.     
 
•  Thirdly, whilst policy making has become more complicated, Europe has no need to 
fear globalisation. Even though domestic demand developments have been relatively 
weak over the period since 1995 in a significant number of EU countries, the external 
side has been relatively encouraging. Unlike the US and Japan, the EU has managed to 
maintain its dominant world market share position over this period despite the 
emergence of countries such as China as major trading powers. In terms of production 
                                                 
8 With labour more abundant at the world level and capital relatively scarcer, downward pressure has been exerted on wages relative to the 
return on capital.   10
relocation patterns, while there is evidence of some negative shifts in demand patterns, 
the EU has nevertheless been a net gainer from the outsourcing phenomenon and the 
nature and extent of the FDI outflows have so far not been alarming. In addition, the 
mainstream, optimistic view of globalisation is supported by the terms of trade gains 
achieved by the EU over recent years, with the EU retaining relatively strong pricing 
power in those industries where it has traditionally held a significant global presence, 
such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals.   
 
•  Fourthly, the real source of the EU’s present low growth problem is domestic not 
external in origin. Domestically the EU has a clear structural productivity problem 
which must be addressed. The fundamental source of this structural problem is the 
relatively high share of low technology, labour intensive, sectors in the EU’s overall 
output compared with that of the US and Japan and its relative weakness in terms of 
both the production and use of ICT. To overcome these problems, Member States will 
need to implement a productivity agenda focussed on the following five key areas, 
namely action on the level of regulation; the structure of financial markets; product 
and service market integration; adapting to ageing populations; and progressively 
moving towards an innovation, as opposed to an imitation, based economic model 
focussed on both the production and diffusion of knowledge. Without such an agenda, 
EU GDP per capita growth rates will continue to decline relative to those of other 
developed countries and the EU will fail to elicit a share of the gains to be generated 
from the catching-up processes of the emerging economies.  
 
•  Fifthly, since the classic efficiency gains from deeper trade and capital market 
integration depend heavily on the restructuring of the respective economies 
(specialisation requires restructuring), labour market flexibility is an essential pre-
requisite for a mutually beneficial integration process. In the case of the EU, there 
needs to be a shift of the displaced resources from the low-skilled / labour intensive 
sectors which are strongly affected by globalisation into those higher skilled activities 
where the EU continues to hold its comparative advantage. This takes time and needs 
smooth adjustment mechanisms. At the moment many of the displaced EU workers 
are ending up in lower-skilled service sectors which of course is contributing to the 
EU’s structural productivity problem. The opposite needs to happen since 
globalisation is without doubt a race to the top not the bottom, with US terms of trade 
developments in particular showing the benefits of such a strategy. If the EU wishes to 
avoid a globalisation-induced “race to the bottom” in low to medium-tech industries, it 
must increasingly focus on the EU’s sources of “deep” comparative advantage
9 and on 
creating the framework conditions necessary to convert a reformed EU knowledge 
production / absorption system into a globally competitive industrial structure.  
 
•  Finally, the EU must adapt its economic and social models to the reality that the 
challenges posed by new, large, global players is not going to go away. If anything, it 
will intensify as some of these players move up the value added chain and directly 
compete with us in the more sophisticated product segments. Consequently, while the 
present catching-up processes of economies, such as China and India, undoubtedly 
                                                 
9 Sources of “deep” comparative advantage for a country are activities which are difficult to replicate (not easily substitutable) in a new 
location (such as R&D) or where there are complementarities between the activities (such as in clusters of excellence dependant on networks 
of skilled workers).    
   11
present risks to the EU’s future economic prosperity, this challenge must be accepted 
as inevitable and one which will help define the backdrop to our policy making over 
the coming years and decades. Our policies and institutions must be reformed to 
reflect the reality of greater openness, increased levels of factor mobility and 
interdependence amongst economies. As the present paper stresses, the EU must in 
particular learn the basic lessons of the post-war period and move towards a 
knowledge based, flexible, economic model. This would constitute an optimal EU 
response to the ongoing internationalisation of production processes. While the Lisbon 
strategy is a manifestation of this collective desire for change, implementation of the 
needed reforms will be the litmus test of whether the future will bring a substantial 
improvement in the EU’s gains from globalisation or will confirm the EU’s ongoing 
decline as a global economic power.    
 
1. GLOBALISATION HAS PRODUCED BIG GAINS FOR THE EU IN THE PAST
(20% of the improvement in EU living standards over the post-war period was due to deeper 
economic integration at the world level)
(Globalisation is a major source of EU productivity gains through better specialisation, 
economies of scale, technological content of imports, greater competition and the spur to 
innovation)
KEY MESSAGES 
3. EUROPE HAS NO NEED TO FEAR GLOBALISATION
(EU is presently m ore than holding its own in world export m arkets and will continue to do 
so as long as we implement a focussed productivity agenda)
(On production relocation, the results suggest that the negative effects reported in other 
studies on outsourcing / offshoring are often vastly overestimated and result from using a 
partial as opposed to a general equilibrium  approach . Even using the m ost pessimistic 
Samuelson assumptions, one arrives at long run EU effects of close to zero in both level and 
growth rate terms)
(On China, the results suggest that while its integration into the world economy will be highly 
disruptive, it is not likely on the basis of present trends to pose a serious technological 
threat to the EU, US or Japan over the next 1 to 2 decades)
4. EU’s ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE DOMESTIC NOT EXTERNAL IN ORIGIN
(The real source of the EU’s relatively poor growth outturn in recent years is its structural 
productivity performance - not globalisation)
5. EU FAILURE TO GAIN FROM POST-1990 UPSURGE IN GLOBALISATION REFLECTS 
SHORT RUN TRANSITION / RESTRUCTURING COSTS 
(It is estimated that these globalisation related transition / restructuring costs amounted to 
only 25% of the decline in the EU’s productivity growth rate over the period 1991-2003. In 
addition, despite these short run costs, the potential still exists to reap overall GDP per 
capita gains from globalisation over the coming decades equivalent to those of the EU’s 
Single M arket Program m e) 
6. GLOBALISATION IS A RACE TO THE TOP, NOT THE BOTTOM , W ITH SM OOTH 
ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS AN ESSENTIAL PRE-REQUISITE FOR A MUTUALLY 
BENEFICIAL INTEGRATION PROCESS 
(A successful response to globalisation is dependent on the implementation of a Lisbon 
inspired structural reform programme aimed ultimately at moving the EU towards an 
innovation-based economic model focussed on both the production and diffusion of 
knowledge. The US has gained significantly from such a strategy both recently and in the 
postwar period, with the current US terms of trade gains highlighting the pay-off from 
moving up the value added chain)
7. EU POLICIES MUST ADAPT TO THE NEW GLOBAL REALITY – CHINA AND INDIA ARE SET 
TO REGAIN THEIR PREVIOUS 19th CENTURY GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOMINANCE BY 2035
(EU policies and institutions need to be reformed to reflect the challenges of greater 
openness, increased levels of factor mobility and interdependence amongst economies)
2. GLOBALISATION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GENERATE LARGE FUTURE GAINS
(The simulations suggest that while the EU has not gained from globalisation over the period 
1990-2003, it has the potential to reap significant, permanent, annual gains of 8% (i.e. €800 
billion) in the level of GDP per capita over the coming decades. While the static effects of 
globalisation are shown to be small, the dynamic effects are considerable and are crucially 
dependent on dom estic restructuring - induced by higher com petition and TFP spillover 
effects)
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Section 1 : Introductory Remarks and Conceptual Framework 
 
Globalisation is neither an inevitable nor indeed an irreversible phenomenon. It is driven by 
the desire of policy makers to liberalise their economies based on an assessment of the 
potential economic gains from this process and from the ongoing influence of technological 
advancements in facilitating an expansion of business opportunities at the worldwide level. Its 
nature evolves over time to reflect this complex mix of economic, technological and political 
forces which ultimately shapes the different phases of worldwide integration.  
 
Globalisation is also a much talked about phenomenon, with conflicting signals as regards its 
short and long run impact. The present paper tries to look at this highly emotive topic with as 
much detachment as possible, to isolate the key channels via which it impacts on our 
economies and to quantify its effects in terms of our present and future standards of living.  
 
Whilst globalisation is a process that has been with us for centuries, its breadth and impact 
has ebbed and flowed over the decades in line with the prevailing liberalisation / protectionist 
mood of the times. The last 20 years has witnessed an important shift towards the 
liberalisation camp, with the traditional Triad motor of integration being augmented by the 
rapid opening up of a number of large, developing world, economies. In total, 700 million 
new workers have been added to the world’s, non-agricultural, labour force since 1995, with 
an additional 1 ½ billion expected over the period to 2030
10.  
 
But globalisation is much more than a large labour supply shock, with the quality and usage 
of the released human capital being a much more defining development. The ultimate focus of 
this paper is on the EU’s capacity to adapt to the challenges posed by the higher levels of 
productivity growth in the developing world; to the sharp expansion in worldwide investment 
flows to these regions and to the greater volumes of international trade in both intermediate 
and final goods and services generated by production relocation.  
 
These trends are also leading to a significant increase in worldwide competition levels, with 
many companies being forced to operate at the global level, and to combine the comparative 
advantages of different production locations, in order to remain internationally competitive. 
The use of worldwide production locations provides firms with the potential for significant 
cost advantages as well as direct access to new and expanding markets, sources of finance and 
technology.  
 
Conceptualisation of Globalisation : Conceptually we adopt a fairly standard approach to the 
analysis of globalisation, concentrating our empirical work on a range of indicators such as 
capital flows, trade patterns, international R&D flows and to a lesser extent migration (see 
summary diagram 1). On the modelling side we focus on the key transmission channels 
namely specialisation
11; economies of scale; technological spillovers (i.e. diffusion of best 
technologies / practices) and finally the benefits of import competition in terms of consumer 
gains from reduced prices and increased varieties and the productivity gains from the 
                                                 
10 Quote from D. Evans, former US Commerce Secretary : "In May 1945 there were 24 countries as democracies and free-market economies, 
driven by competition. Sixty years on there are more than 100. It has gone from a couple of hundred million workers to more than 2 billion in 
free market economies and includes India and China. So we have to prepare ourselves for competing with billions of other workers around 
the world" (Financial Times, February 2006). 
11 Countries should specialise in areas where they have a comparative advantage, with the latter reflecting either different factor intensities 
(Hecksher-Ohlin models) or relative technology differences (Ricardian models). By exploiting differences in productivity and resources 
across countries, international trade can ensure a higher level of consumption / welfare compared with a situation where no trade takes place.    13
reallocation of resources amongst firms (i.e. a shake-out of inefficient producers towards 
more efficient operators). The ultimate target variable is undoubtedly productivity which in 
the long run is the key driver of GDP per capita trends. 
 
Globalisation : Conceptual Framework
Key Globalisation Indicators




U ltim ate Target V ariables
Productivity
GDP per capita (W elfare)
How Globalisation Impacts on 
Economies
1. Comparative Advantage / 
Specialisation
2. Economies of Scale
3. Technological Spillovers
4. Im port C om petition *
 
* Import competition leads to consumer gains (lower prices / mark-ups + larger variety of goods and 
services) and to domestic productivity gains from the reallocation of resources from low productivity to 
high productivity firms. In addition, open markets drive innovation / R&D spending due to the heightened 
foreign competition and the fact that the rewards from innovation are greater because of the larger 
market size. 
 
Given the present state of our modelling work and especially the fact that no distinction is 
made in the globalisation model between skilled and unskilled workers, we do not draw any 
conclusions regarding the income distribution consequences of globalisation. We do however 
look at the degree of real wage adjustment which is necessary at the macro level in order to 
ensure that there is no negative employment effect from globalisation. While the simulations 
in this paper suggest that the level of real wage adjustment at the macro level is not dramatic, 
there can be little doubt that for particular skill groups and sectors the adjustment process will 
be more problematic. 
 
Research methodology employed : A combination of approaches are used to assess the short 
and longer term impact of globalisation. We look firstly at the long run empirical evidence 
regarding the different waves of globalisation over time (i.e. from the 19
th century onwards) 
and we quantify the GDP per capita gains for the EU over the post-war period. Given the 
focus on the post-1990 wave of globalisation, we look at the data trends over the period 1991-
2003 in more detail to see whether the EU would be justified in taking an optimistic or 
pessimistic view of greater global integration over this period. This empirics driven 
assessment of globalisation is structured around five key themes and their impact on the EU; 
the effects of global production relocation; trade integration and the threat of China; shifts in 
international R&D patterns; non-oil terms of trade developments; and finally global 
productivity and GDP per capita income trends. Each of these five themes are treated 
separately using a type of partial equilibrium approach, with the essential insights garnered 
from this analysis used as the basic inputs for the general equilibrium assessment of the total 
period from 1991-2050. In addition to the normal trade, investment and price transmission 
channels of a standard, open economy, model, the one used in this paper has three specific 
features which try to capture the specificities of the post-1990 globalisation phase : 
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•  Firstly, intermediate inputs are included as an explicit factor of production in the 
model's production function, thereby enabling an effective analysis of the 
outsourcing / offshoring issue. 
 
•  Secondly, the consumption and investment deflators have been quality adjusted to 
allow for the welfare effects of a globalisation induced increase in the variety and 
quality of imports of final consumption / capital goods as well as in intermediate 
inputs. 
 
•  Finally, the model’s structure allows for an extensive exploration of the links 
between technological progress and shifts in global demand patterns.  
 
Structure of Paper : In terms of the layout of the paper, following the present introduction, 
section 2 looks at the longer run globalisation trends from the 19
th century onwards as well as 
at the specific drivers of the post-1990 period. Section 3 goes on to quantify the historical 
post-war gains for the EU from globalisation and to provide a brief overview of the present 
debate on the benefits and costs of integration, with the objective of identifying the important 
indicators for welfare measurement. Sections 4 and 5 focus on the period 1990-2050, with the 
former describing the major globalisation related stylised facts since the beginning of the 
1990s and the latter providing a model based quantification of the benefits and costs over the 
period as a whole.  More specifically, section 4 looks at the empirical evidence in relation to 
the five key globalisation themes mentioned earlier and tries to draw some partial equilibrium 
conclusions regarding their overall impact on the EU. Section 5 then quantifies the short and 
longer term gains/losses of the globalisation process over the period to 2050. 
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Section 2. Globalisation Trends 
 
Economic globalisation is not a new phenomenon. Trade, capital and people have been 
flowing across borders for centuries, with the intensity of these flows growing significantly 
since the middle of the 19
th century.  Whilst the process of globalisation has not been smooth, 
with significant setbacks experienced especially during the interwar period, it is reasonable to 
conclude that, with the exception of international labour markets, the degree of integration in 
terms of global trade and capital flows has been on a broadly rising trajectory over time. This 
long run tendency towards growing worldwide economic ties has been driven by both 
improvements in transport and communications technologies and by public policy initiatives, 
although the latter have not always been beneficial to the integration process. These driving 
factors have acted to significantly reduce the cost and non-cost barriers to transporting 
goods
12, services and factors of production (labour, capital and knowledge) across national 
frontiers, with significant benefits for the world economy.  In terms of structure, the present 
section will provide a short overview of the broad, long term, trends for globalisation (2.1)
13 
before focussing in on the key features of the post-1990 acceleration in integration (2.2).  
 
 
2.1 Longer Run Trends 1820-2000 – What can we learn ? 
 
2.1.1 : Population, GDP and GDP per capita developments : Graphs 1 and 2 give the 
world population / GDP shares, as well as GDP per capita levels for the OECD countries, for 
China / India and for the rest of the world over the period 1820-2001. A number of interesting 
points emerge from these graphs : 
 
•  Firstly, the OECD’s share of world GDP has always been significantly higher than 
would have been justified by its share of world population, providing support for the 
view that policies are much more important than demographics in shaping the 
economic fortunes of countries. 
 
•  Secondly, this economic outperformance of the OECD region has, if anything, tended 
to grow over time. Part of this outperformance is undoubtedly linked to the fact that 
the trade and capital market liberalisation which took place from the mid-19
th century 
onwards (at least up until the mid-1980’s) was to a large extent a developed world 
phenomenon. 
 
•  Thirdly, in the context of the recent liberalisation policies been pursued by China and 
India, it is interesting to note that in 1820 both these countries produced nearly 50% of 
world output, making them the dominant world economic powers at that time. With a 
present share of world GDP of less than 20%, a world population share of close to 
40% and with the pursuit of OECD-inspired economic policies, it is relatively safe to 
predict a significant rebalancing of world economic power in the coming decades. 
According to Goldman Sachs (2005), China and India will regain their previous 19
th 
century dominance relatively quickly, with China overtaking the US as the world’s 
                                                 
12 Cline (1999) estimates that roughly half of the increase in trade was due to policy liberalisation (lower tariffs, fewer quotas), with the other 
half due to technological progress in transport and communications. 
13 This sub-section looks at global population, GDP and GDP per capita developments since the early 19
th century before examining the three 
key drivers of economic integration over this period namely trade flows, capital market integration and labour / migration patterns.        
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largest economy in US dollars terms around 2035 and with India the third largest 
economy by that time.   
 
•  Finally, the population and GDP developments are combined in Graph 2 to give the 
GDP per capita trends in levels over time. This graph underlines the outstanding 
relative economic performance of the OECD grouping of countries over nearly two 
centuries, with global per capita income differentials tending to grow over time. 
Standards of living in the OECD have grown in fact from less than twice the levels of 
the rest of the world in 1820, to a level which was 6 times greater in 2001. The graph 
also highlights the enormous scope for catching-up for the rest of the world countries, 
including India and China, over the coming decades, with the ultimate success of such 
a convergence process dependent on the economic policies pursued at the individual 
country level and on a further deepening of the present levels of globalisation. 
 
Graph 1 : % Shares of World Population and GDP (1820-2001) 
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Source : Maddison (2001) and own calculations 
 
Graph 2 : Levels of GDP per capita (1820-2001) 
China / India, OECD and Rest of World 
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2.1.2 : Trade Integration :  Trade flows are a crucial indicator of the degree and pace of 
worldwide economic integration, with the growth gains of policies aimed at greater trade 
openness being at the centre of the debate on globalisation
14.  Graph 3 gives an overview of 
the importance of world trade as a percentage of world GDP over time and of the respective 
shares of world trade by the OECD and non-OECD economies. The most important points to 
note are as follows : 
 
•  Firstly, if one uses world trade flows as a % of GDP as a proxy for the globalisation 
process as a whole, one can see clearly from Graph 3 that this process is by no means 
inevitable and is subject to considerable setbacks at the hands of policy makers. 
While the overall trend since 1870 has been upwards, the interwar years were a timely 
reminder of the reversibility of the process, with world trade as a % of GDP
15 being 
cut in half over these years as the tide of protectionism took hold in the major trading 
powers. 
 
•  Secondly, the shift in the post-war WWII period to more open policies ensured that 
trade integration has been a striking feature of the world economy over recent 
                                                 
14 Trade liberalisation on its own will not, of course, generate higher growth. However, combined with good government, macroeconomic 
stability and high levels of investment in all forms of physical and human capital, it has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically that 
greater openness is good for growth.  Theoretically, a variety of trade-related channels (specialisation according to comparative advantage; 
higher levels of competition; economies of scale benefits; enhanced product varieties; technological transfers; higher R&D intensities) have 
been shown to boost productivity and living standards. Empirically, Frankel and Romer (1999) estimated that a rise of 1% point in the ratio 
of trade to GDP (in a sample of 63 countries) was associated with gains in per capita incomes of between 0.5 and 2%. Other studies (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998) suggest that more open economies tend to grow faster than less open ones. While there are some 
dissenting voices to this mainstream view (eg Rodrik and Rodriguez, 2001), these criticisms largely refer to the benefits from trade for less 
developed countries where some additional institutional reforms may be needed before the potential advantages from trade liberalisation can 
be realised. Finally, even the critics accept that no country has ever prospered on a sustainable basis by closing itself off to trade. One can 
conclude therefore that trade is a major source of income / productivity gains for countries, with most studies pointing to a significant 
positive relationship between openness and productivity growth (i.e. more open economies achieve faster growth). 
15 The ratio of trade to GDP rises as income rises when the income elasticity of demand for imports exceeds unity.   19
decades, with the volume of goods presently traded being more than 15 times greater 
than in 1950 and with its share in GDP tripling. While some commentators insist that 
the present GDP share for merchandise trade is only at pre-World War 1 levels, this 
analogy takes no account of the growing share of the relatively less tradeable service 
sector in GDP over the intervening period and consequently of the fact that world 
trade in goods as a share of world industrial production is now at unprecedented 
levels.   
 
•  Thirdly, the growing integration of national economies into the world’s trading 
system over the post-war period was driven not only by trade liberalisation but also 
by falling transportation and communication costs, rising income levels, higher 
productivity growth rates in tradeables compared with non-tradeables, and more 
recently by an ICT-enabled acceleration in the international division of labour linked 
with the development of increasingly global production systems. All these 
developments have led to a sharp increase in overall trade flows, underpinned by an 
expansion in both intra-industry flows and in a range of internationally tradeable 
services. 
 
•  Finally, in terms of shares of world trade, graph 3 highlights the dominance of the 
OECD countries in the global trading system, with the OECD’s world share 
consistently in the 60-70% range over the whole period 1870 to the late 1990’s. While 
the rest of the world, most notably China, have been making large gains in terms of 
their world market shares over the most recent years, the graph underlines the extent 
of the gap to be made up by these countries over the coming decades.   
 
Graph 3 : World Trade as % of GDP + % Shares of World Exports (1870-1998) 
China / India, OECD and Rest of World 
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Source : Crafts (2000), Maddison (2001) and own calculations 
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2.1.3 : Capital Market Integration : A heated debate continues to rage regarding the present 
degree and nature of global capital market integration compared with historical periods. 
Graphs 4a and 4b include a stylized view of the changes in global capital mobility over the 
period 1860-2000 as well as an indication of the stock of foreign capital (as a % of world 
GDP) held over the period 1870-1998. The main points to be retained from the graphs are as 
follows : 
 
•  Regarding capital mobility, according to Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), an analysis of 
the data is suggestive of a U-shape in the evolution of international capital mobility 
since the late 19
th century, with “a dramatic decline in capital mobility in the interwar 
period, and a very slow recovery thereafter”.   
 
•  This U-shaped pattern of global capital market integration has clearly been influenced 
to a significant extent by policy makers’ efforts over the century to deal with the 
classic macroeconomic policy trilemma for open economies whereby countries must 
relinquish at least one of the “impossible trinity” of an independent monetary policy, a 
fixed exchange rate or capital account convertibility (i.e. capital mobility).   
 
•  As shown in Graph 4a, in the pre-1914 period, the Gold Standard stimulated 
international capital flows at the expense of foregoing the domestic monetary policy 
instrument. Following World War II, the Bretton Woods system went for a 
combination of fixed exchange rates and domestic monetary policy flexibility, with 
tightly controlled capital movements being an inevitable consequence of this regime 
choice.  Finally, with the broad move to flexible exchange rates and liberalised capital 
accounts, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime, international capital 
movements have started to grow again.  What graph 4a appears to suggest is that 
global capital mobility has now reached a level which is at its highest for 150 years.  
 
•  This view on capital mobility is corroborated by graph 4b which shows that the stock 
of world external assets was close to 80% of world GDP at the end of the 1990’s. This 
level of foreign capital holdings was around 4 times greater than those existing at the 
end of the 19
th  century.   
 
•  While policy changes are clearly hastening the return to a pre-1914 type of global 
capital market, in the sense of freedom of capital movements, the nature of the 
financial flows would appear to be very different to those of the Gold Standard days. 
In particular, the volume of cross border flows is now being driven to a much greater   21
extent by short-term capital flows such as hedging and risk-sharing between 
developed economies rather than by longer term flows of savings from capital-rich 
countries to those less developed countries in need of development finance. A second 
defining feature of the present phase of capital movements is the growing importance 
of multinationals in terms of FDI flows. Given continuing restrictions on migration 
and growing labour force shortages in the ageing developed world, this recent 
spectacular growth in the importance of FDI flows is set to continue and indeed to 
intensify over the coming decades. 
 
•  Perceptions of relative risk are also a factor in explaining why past flows to 
developing countries have been very geographically concentrated, with a large share 
going to east Asia and China, and with over 90% of the total flows going to middle 
income countries, with outward-looking, growth-oriented policy frameworks, capable 
of offering a pool of relatively skilled labour to potential investors. These latter factors 
would appear to be more important influences on the investment location decisions of 
multinational companies, compared with other, often-quoted, issues such as low wage 
costs. 
  
•  These established trends suggest that developing countries, with credible, reform-
oriented, policies can in turn reap the benefits of greater and more stable forms of 
financial flows such as that represented by FDI.  In fact, in terms of the composition of 
total net flows to developing economies, by far the most significant development, 
especially during the 1990’s, has been the increasing importance of FDI and equity 
flows, with official public assistance to these countries as well as highly volatile 
syndicated bank lending both declining as a share of the total.   
 
•  In overall terms, however, while capital mobility may be at historically high levels, 
many commentators would suggest that the bulk of the increased flows are essentially 
still a developed world phenomenon, driven in large part by the increasing integration 
of the financial markets of the TRIAD grouping. This view still holds despite the 
evidence for some noteworthy increases in financial flows to specific developing 
countries in the 1990’s (e.g. China) and the trend towards relatively stable forms of 
financing for these countries such as FDI. Even allowing for these encouraging trends, 
overall capital movements to developing countries still appear relatively small 
compared with total global flows and with the supposedly high level of potential 
returns linked with productivity differentials. In addition, while the volume of gross 
flows to developing economies may have risen substantially as a share of GDP, 
overall net long run flows, which are crucial for growth and per capita income 
convergence, have remained subdued, especially for the low income developing 
countries where flows have also fluctuated strongly over short periods of time. This 
evidence would suggest that global capital market integration has still significant room 








   22
Graph 4 : Capital Mobility +  Stocks of Foreign Capital (% of World GDP)  
(1860-2000) 
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4a Stylized View of Capital Mobility 
1860-2000
Source : Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), Crafts (2000), Maddison (2001) 
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2.1.4 : Labour Market Integration : Over the period 1850-1914, most countries of Western 
Europe were countries of emigration, with millions of Europeans migrating to the US, Canada 
and Australia. As with trade and capital market integration, labour market movements were 
reduced enormously over the “de-globalisation” period from 1914 to the end of the second 
World War. Immigration restrictions, the “Great Depression” as well as the two world wars 
put paid to large intercontinental movements of workers (as well as to trade and capital 
market integration). This dark episode in the history of globalisation gave way to more 
enlightened policies in the post WWII period, with international migration patterns also been 
favourably affected. The figures on migration flows for this period are shown in Graph 5, 
with these trends suggestive of a number of general conclusions : 
 
•  Firstly, the countries of Western Europe are no longer countries of emigration, with 
Graph 5b indicating that the EU15 has become an important destination for 
international migrants. While the pattern for the net number of migrants has 
undoubtedly been erratic, the trend over time for the EU15 countries is clearly towards   23
large net inflows of foreigners, with the absolute levels of inflows broadly matching 
those of the US over the period since the early 1990’s. 
 
•  Secondly, the worldwide flow of migrants is clearly towards the more developed 
regions of the world and away from the developing world, with Graph 5a indicating 
that these flows are currently running at about 2 ½ million on an annual average basis, 
with a large proportion of these migrants heading towards the EU15 and the US. 
These flows are being driven mainly by economic considerations, such as sharp 
divergences in per capita incomes and ongoing reductions in transportation costs for 
migrants. 
 
•  Thirdly, while the present post WWII migration flows may appear large, it is 
important to put these flows into perspective historically. While annual movements of 
1 - 1 ¼ million into the US and Europe may in absolute terms be similar to the inflows 
of migrants into the US at the beginning of the 20
th century, the rate of migration is 
nevertheless substantially slower. For example, the US immigration rate over the 
period 1900-1910 (i.e. 11.6 per thousand) was thirty times higher than it is at 
present
16. Consequently, whilst international migration may have recovered in the post 
WWII period, the immigration controls imposed after the war have ensured that it has 
not reached the levels experienced in the 1850-1914 globalisation period.   
 
•  Finally, not only is migration at substantially lower rates now than in the past, the 
nature of those flows has also changed. In the first wave of globalisation, international 
migration was largely unrestricted, with the new overseas territories offering 
significant opportunities for both low and high skilled workers in a range of primary 
extractive industries as well as in emerging industrial sectors.  The second wave has 
seen the imposition of restrictive immigration policies, with the movement of 
unskilled workers severely curtailed in favour of people with scarce skills and high 
educational attainment levels. This trend in favour of much higher international 
mobility for skilled legal migrants is well established, with the international market for 
skilled labour becoming more highly integrated over recent decades in parallel with 
the increasing globalisation of capital and goods markets. However, despite the 
shrinking demand for lower skilled workers in the more technologically advanced 
economies over this period, it is also clear that efforts to curtail the movement of 
unskilled labour has been and will continue to be problematic. Large and often 
growing divergences in the income levels of such workers in different parts of the 
world has ensured that whilst immigration restrictions may have slowed the pace of 
integration of the world’s low-skilled labour markets, the attraction of illegal 








                                                 
16 It is interesting to note that these exceptionally high migration rates provoked a backlash in the US at that time due to a slowing in the rate 
of real wage growth of workers and due to a significant widening in income disparities. 
17 Such movements have the potential to significantly erode North-South income gaps. According to Lindert and Williamson (2001), "all of 
the real wage convergence before World War 1 was attributable to migration, about two-thirds of the GDP per worker convergence, and 
perhaps one half of the GDP per capita convergence".   24
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Conclusions on Longer Run Trends : This sub-section has shown that the post-WWII 
“globalisation” phase differs in a number of important respects compared with that of the late 
19
th and early 20
th centuries.  The current trend is characterised by lower rates of labour 
migration into developed countries, especially of unskilled workers; more trade, especially of 
the intra-industry type as well as the growing tradeability of the service economy; a greater 
preponderance towards short-term capital movements and, finally, the growing importance of 
multinationals in terms of FDI flows. In a way, given the greater political difficulties 
presently attached to reproducing the large migration flows of the early 20
th century, the 
growth in FDI flows can, at least partially, be seen as a type of substitute for labour flows. 
Technology, allied to globalisation and capital market liberalisation, has already generated a 
huge increase in the volume of capital movements in general and FDI flows in particular, with 
multinationals increasingly important in determining worldwide investment trends. If the pace 
over the last 20 years is anything to go by, this is likely to be one of the defining structural 
developments of the 21st century. In addition, in order to capture the extent of the structural 
shifts, it is important not only to look at FDI but also at other specific investment categories 
such as R&D, which is now much more internationally mobile compared with previous 
decades. It is against this backdrop that we examine in 2.2 the specificities of the post-1990 
surge in globalisation. 
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2.2 Policy and technology driven acceleration in globalisation from 1990 onwards 
 
While an analysis of the broad trends for globalisation over the last 150 years is enlightening 
in terms of understanding the basic determinants and fundamental fragility of the process, 
policy makers are understandably much more interested in the most recent past.  For this 
reason the present section will focus on the post-1990 acceleration in the global integration 
process. Three key features distinguish this phase - firstly, a further expansion in both trade 
and capital market integration; secondly, an ICT induced and ICT enabled acceleration in the 
global relocation of production processes; and finally a worldwide income and technological 
convergence process which is being driven by the shift from planned to market economies 
and is being facilitated by the relatively good human capital endowments in the countries 
concerned. The following paragraphs try to capture the scale and nature of the changes which 
have occurred in these three areas.  
 
2.2.1 : Further Acceleration in Trade and Capital Market Integration : The fall of the 
iron curtain in Europe and the opening up of China, India and parts of central and Latin 
America have led to a further increase in international trade and capital flows. World trade is 
continuing to grow at rates well in excess of world output and flows of private capital have 
expanded rapidly. Graph 6a shows that the volume of these capital flows, as a percentage of 
world GDP, have more than doubled since the early 1990’s, with graph 6b indicating that 
world exports of goods and services were also growing steadily over this period to reach a 
share of close to 25% of world output
18. 
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Source : World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
 
2.2.2 : Deepening in the global relocation of production processes : The increase in 
international trade has not been confined to the exchange of finished goods and services since 
there has also been an expansion in the share of intermediate inputs which are traded 
internationally. This intermediate trade forms part of the growing trend towards the 
internationalisation of production. This pattern has been ongoing for decades but has 
accelerated since the early 1990’s with the growth in the relocation of labour intensive 
manufacturing and business-related services to lower cost locations around the globe. This is 
                                                 
18 This compares with an average EU15 figure of 47% in 2003 for exports and imports (18% for extra-EU15 and 29% for intra-EU15).   26
being driven by multinationals seeking to take advantage of changes in global specialisation 
patterns and by the need to focus their developed world activities on the higher value added 
parts of the production process.  
 
Domestic firms are voluntarily relocating a wide range of activities to foreign countries 
essentially via 2 mechanisms :  
 
•  external outsourcing (i.e. contracting out parts of the production process to foreign 
suppliers) and by  
 
•  offshoring (i.e. moving production abroad by setting up foreign subsidiaries). 
 
Outsourcing and offshoring
19 are part of the wider process of “global relocation”
20 which is 
the overall term used in the present paper to capture the international trade, FDI and demand 
implications from the voluntary and involuntary transfer of production and business services 
abroad (in part or in whole).  
 
While the demand implications of global relocation (i.e. the involuntary aspect) will be 
discussed later on in the paper, graph 7 provides an indication of the offshoring and 
outsourcing aspects of this phenomenon. In terms of offshoring, the graph indicates that the 
global stock of inward FDI has exploded over the 1990’s from less than 10% of GDP in the 
first half of the decade to well over 20% in the second half. With regard to outsourcing, we 
measure this phenomenon by taking the total imports of intermediate goods (i.e. parts and 
components and semi-finished goods) as well as the “other services” category of services 
imports which includes a range of financial and computing and other business services. Using 
this definition, the overall global outsourcing market has grown by about 3% points of GDP 
over the last 10-12 years, from 8 ¼% in 1990 to 11 ¼ % of world GDP in 2003, with roughly 













                                                 
19 Regarding the voluntary aspects, outsourcing refers to the contracting out of a range of economic activities (linked to the intermediate 
stages of the production process) to external suppliers. These activities include business related services as well as the production of parts 
and components and semi-finished goods. Outsourcing is measured by the growth rate of both non-oil intermediate goods imports and 
business-related international services. Offshoring, on the other hand, refers to the process whereby firms retain the ownership of the whole 
production process but locate parts of their activities abroad by setting up subsidiaries. Offshoring is measured by FDI flows. Outsourcing 
and offshoring are of course linked in cases where the foreign supplier of the intermediate inputs is owned by the importing company. It is 
not therefore possible to distinguish between outsourcing / offshoring using data on intermediate imports since the latter could be intra-firm 
transactions or imports from independent foreign firms. 
20 The “global relocation” concept refers to all forms of economic activities (i.e. intermediate and final) and can involve either the closure or 
scaling down of complete industries or parts of industries in a certain location in favour of another (e.g. textiles) or the emergence of new 
industries (e.g. ICT). It essentially reflects the changes in domestic business strategies which result from a globalisation-induced heightening 
in both worldwide competition levels and in the pace of technological change. “Global relocation” is equivalent to the French concept of 
“delocalisation”.   27
GRAPH 7 : GLOBAL RELOCATION OF PRODUCTION PROCESSES (VOLUNTARY ASPECTS : 
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2.2.3 : Global Income and Technological Convergence : In addition to the integration of 
economies through trade and financial flows, economic globalisation is also being driven by 
the movement of knowledge (technology) across borders. The emerging economies, 
especially the EU’s new Member States, India, China and other south east Asian countries 
have exhibited strong productivity growth. On average productivity growth in the rest of the 
world (world excl. EU15 and US) was about ½ a % point higher than in the EU over the last 
10-15 years
21. This process of income convergence is likely to continue over the coming 
decades, underpinned by a persistence of the existing TFP growth rate differentials. As 
indicated by many growth studies, a country’s level of long run income per capita is strongly 
related to human capital. Amongst many of the emerging economies in Europe and Asia, 
human capital is available in relative abundance. 
  
Definition of Globalisation : All three developments taken together (i.e. trade and capital 
market integration, production relocation and global convergence trends) is what we use to 
define globalisation in the rest of the paper. This is a very wide definition. Various authors see 
globalisation simply as a process enabling the free movement of goods, services, labour and 
capital. This is what Martin Wolf (2004), for example, defines as ‘liberal globalisation’. 
Especially in recent years, the global “relocation” of production (our second aspect) is often 
regarded as a typical characteristic of globalisation. It can of course also be seen as one form 
which the free movement of goods, services and capital can take. Nevertheless “relocation” 
incorporates other aspects as well. Most likely it depends on some technological 
developments which have taken place in recent years and which have further reduced the 
costs of international transactions and communications. In addition, the “relocation” 
phenomenon is also related to the third element of our definition, technical progress 
connected to the availability of skilled labour in the developing economies of the world which 
makes it easier for firms to shift production.  
 
This wide definition of globalisation also encompasses the notion that increased international 
trade integration and diverging productivity growth rate trends are not mutually independent 
phenomena. Strong productivity growth in the developing world can be regarded as a driving 
force for greater trade integration. Obviously, there is also the facilitation of further trade 
                                                 
21 The EU’s TFP growth rate differentials with some of the more dynamic world regions are in fact much higher. In some cases, they are as 
high as 2 % points.   28
integration through the ongoing decrease in transportation costs and trade barriers but this is 
not what we would regard as the typical characteristic of globalisation as we have experienced 
it since the beginning of the 1990s. The process of mere trade integration has a long history 
and goes back at least until the 19
th century. What we regard as typical for the 1990s is the 
economic liberalisation which has taken place in large areas of the world and which enables 
countries to make full use of their productive potential combined with the increased 
international mobility of capital, most notably FDI  
  
3 KEY FEATURES OF POST-1990 GLOBALISATION PHASE




- Shifts in Demand Patterns
Global Income and 
Technological 
Convergence
Further acceleration in trade 
and capital market 
integration
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Section 3 :  Globalisation Debate : Agreements and Disagreements 
 
3.1 Historical gains from globalisation have been substantial for the EU
22 : In terms of an 
historical assessment of the gains from globalisation, a number of methods can be used to 
provide a rough estimate of the EU15’s post-war gains from this process. For the analysis we 
employ two approaches which are widely applied in the literature : 
 
•  Openness : One approach is to use the long run elasticity of output per capita with 
respect to openness (measured as exports plus imports as a % of GDP). While a wide 
range of estimates exist in the literature for this elasticity, the Denis et al (2004) 
estimate of about 0.3 is reasonably representative of those applied to OECD countries. 
Applying this elasticity to the increase in openness (extra-EU) achieved by the EU 
over the period 1950-2002 would suggest that about 20% of the increase in EU15 
living standards over this period can be attributed to the EU’s growing integration into 
the world’s economy
23. Taking the effects of intra-EU trade flows into account, the 
benefits would actually be pushed up to an estimated gain of about 30%. 
 
•  International TFP spillovers : These tentative estimates of the gains from 
globalisation based on "openness" are corroborated by applying a Helpman and Coe 
(1995) model for calculating international R&D spillover effects. In their model they 
allow TFP to be affected by domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks, with foreign 
R&D being a trade weighted average of the R&D capital of an individual country’s 
trading partners. They arrive at an elasticity estimate for domestic R&D of 0.23 to be 
applied to all countries and country specific elasticities for the foreign component. The 
country specific effects arise from 2 sources, firstly from the direct effects from trade 
and secondly from the indirect effects resulting from the fact that one country’s TFP is 
positively affected by that of its trading partners. According to these estimates, the 
average elasticity of foreign research on US TFP is about 0.13 which is lower than the 
average foreign R&D elasticity for EU countries such as Germany, France, Italy and 
the UK where the elasticity is substantially higher at about 0.22. This difference is 
explained by the fact that firstly the US (with its large economic weight and with its 
relatively high R&D intensity) is included as a provider of foreign R&D and secondly 
EU countries are generally more open than the US and consequently the R&D 
                                                 
22 According to Wolf (2004), based on work from Douglas Irwin ("Free Trade Under Fire" – 2002), trade is an extension across frontiers of 
the division of labour. It has direct, indirect and intellectual / moral advantages. : " In the first category come the standard static gains from 
trade – exploitation of economies of scale and comparative advantage. Trade in accordance with comparative advantage is similar to a 
productivity increase. Instead of making a particular good, an economy can obtain more of it, indirectly, by exporting something else. These 
gains can be large. A classic example was the opening of Japan in 1858, under American pressure. Before opening, the prices of silk and tea 
were much higher in the world than in Japan, while the prices of cotton and woollen goods were far lower. After opening, Japan exported silk 
and tea and imported cotton and woollen goods. This is estimated to have increased Japan's real income by 65 per cent without considering 
the long-run productivity and growth impact of its joining the world economy. In the second indirect category come the dynamic gains from 
trade. Trade promotes competition and productivity growth. Companies innovate in response to competitive pressure. Widening the market 
to include more competitors increases this pressure. Trade is also a conduit for foreign technology, via imports of capital and intermediate 
goods that embody significant innovations. Professor Irwin observes that even in the United States between a quarter and a half of growth in 
so called 'total factor productivity', the part of productivity growth not explained by capital accumulation and improved skills, is attributable 
to new technology embodied in capital equipment. No developing country would have access to the world's advanced technologies without 
trade". Finally, regarding the intellectual / moral advantages of trade "To the extent that trade facilitates growth, for example, it has made a 
powerful contribution to the arrival of democracy" all around the world. 
23 For example, a 5 percentage point increase in the EU's ratio of trade to GDP (i.e. from 30% of GDP to 35%) would be roughly equal to a 
17 percent increase in the EU15's trade openness. Using a 0.3 coefficient, such an increase in the exposure of the EU to foreign trade 
competition would be expected to result in a 5 percent increase in the per capita incomes of EU citizens. These income gains from increased 
trade reflect the benefits of countries specialising according to their respective comparative advantages; from companies being able to spread 
fixed costs over more output (i.e. economies of scale from having access to bigger markets); from the diffusion of new and better production 
technologies; and from the many consumer and producer benefits of increased import competition. 
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spillover effects are greater. As regards the smaller EU Member States, the Helpman 
and Coe methodology would produce foreign R&D elasticities of  0.25. 
 
These elasticities imply that for the US, the foreign source for TFP growth amounts to 
about 50% (i.e. 0.13 / 0.23) of domestic TFP growth. For the larger EU countries the 
foreign source of TFP growth is about 90% whilst for the smaller EU countries the 
foreign source of TFP growth would be more than 100%. This means that without 
international TFP spillovers (generated by trade in Helpman and Coe’s regressions), 
the growth of TFP in the EU would only have been about 50% (.23 / .45) of the actual 
increase in growth, compared with nearly 65% (.23 / .36) of the actual growth for the 
US.  
 
According to the neoclassical growth model, these TFP spillover effects translate 
directly into labour productivity growth and consequently without openness labour 
productivity growth in Europe / US would have been about 50% / 65% respectively of 
the actual growth rate over the post-war period. This productivity estimate also takes 
into account the fact that TFP affects capital accumulation. However, even if we 
would assume that there is no link between capital accumulation and TFP, 
productivity growth in Europe over the period 1950-2000 would still have been about 
30% lower without openness. Again if one adjusts for intra-EU effects, the true 
globalisation effect would be of the order of 20%. 
 
Allowing for intra-EU effects, both approaches (i.e. the long run elasticity of output per capita 
with respect to openness and estimates of the gains from international R&D spillover effects) 
would put the post-war extra-EU macroeconomic gains from globalisation at a minimum of 
20% of the increase in living standards (with these gains coming through in the form of lower 
prices, higher real wages and a greater variety / quality of goods and services). The US gains 
from this second wave of globalisation were also significant (on some measures equivalent to 
those of the EU) and vindicated its decision to be at the vanguard of efforts to promote 
liberalisation policies in the difficult post-war period
24.  
 
The experience of the US in the post-war catching-up processes of the EU and Japan is in fact 
a timely reminder of the importance of rejecting the protectionist pressures which are now 
emerging in many EU member states to the competitive threat of China and India. The US 
encouraged the process of globalisation after World War II by opening up its markets and by 
facilitating large scale external capital outflows, especially to Europe, to exploit the new 
opportunities which were emerging. It also responded positively to the significant competitive 
challenge posed by Europe and Japan by moving increasingly towards an innovation based 
economic model
25. The US’s world class innovation system and the flexibility of its economic 
and regulatory framework enabled it to flourish in the more competitive world marketplace 
which emerged, with the restructuring which took place leading to the creation of new, US-
dominated, industries, such as ICT
26. Due to this positive response, the post-war globalisation 
phase can be characterised as a "win-win" scenario with sharply rising incomes for all of the 
participants, with the US averaging GDP per capita growth rates of close to 2 ½ % annually 
                                                 
24 A study by Bradford, Grieco and Hufbauer (2005) showed similar gains in US living standards from globalisation in the post-war period. 
25 For example, 75% of the US’s productivity growth rate over the period 1950-2003 was based on more knowledge intensive forms of 
investment i.e. increased spending on R&D and education. 
26 The ICT industry was developed in the 1950’s and 1960’s and now accounts for close to 15% of US manufacturing output. In addition, 
since ICT is an innovating, general purpose, technology, it has started to facilitate productivity improvements in the rest of the economy by 
reshaping the activities of a wide range of other manufacturing and service industries.   31
over the period 1950-2000 compared with 3% in the EU and over 5% in Japan. This 
generated both a substantial increase in living standards in the US as well as facilitating a 
significant improvement in the income positions of the EU and Japan relative to the US over 
this period (from levels of only around 50% and 20% respectively in 1950).  
 
3.2 : Greater uncertainties in evaluating the present phase of globalisation  : Three issues 
will be touched on in this sub-section :  
 
•  The general debate about the benefits and costs of globalisation (3.2.1);  
 
•  How does outsourcing affect the different interpretations of globalisation (3.2.2); and 
 
•  The specific issue of the timing of the effects i.e. differentiating between the short and 
long run (3.2.3).  
 
3.2.1 : Various viewpoints on the benefits of globalisation : Looking at globalisation in the 
context of the gains achieved in the overall post-war period, an important question to be 
addressed is how will the post-1990 international productivity trends, and the changes in the 
international division of labour implied by them, affect our interpretation of the ongoing gains 
to be achieved ? There are two extreme positions, an optimistic and a pessimistic one :  
 
•  According to the optimistic view (held by many trade economists and which should be 
regarded as the mainstream position), productivity increases in the developing 
economies are welfare improving for EU citizens
27. The reason is that the goods and 
services produced in these countries (which are not perfect substitutes for goods and 
services produced in the EU) tend to be sold at a lower price in order for them to be 
absorbed by the world market. Thus domestic consumers and investors would benefit 
from increased productivity in the rest of the world (RoW). Also income growth in 
these emerging economies leads to higher demand for EU goods and services which 
increases the price of EU tradeables. Thus industrialised regions benefit both in terms 
of an increase in their terms of trade and an increase in demand for their products and 
services. More recently, much attention has been devoted in the literature to a third 
advantage from an expansion in trade and technical progress in the RoW, namely 
access for consumers to an increased variety / quality of imported goods. Broda and 
Weinstein (2005) argue that increased variety rather than pure price effects dominate 
the welfare gains for consumers resulting from trade liberalisation. They estimate that 
in the case of the US the value of increased product variety to consumers, derived 
from trade liberalisation, is equivalent to about 3% of US GDP. This is about 3 times 
the assumed traditional effect from the gains from trade, as estimated by Feenstra 
                                                 
27 According to the 2005 EU Review : "The widespread popular ambivalence towards globalisation in general and relocation in particular, 
stands in stark contrast to the sanguine view shared by most economists that trade and investment liberalisation is an important source of 
rising living standards for the overall population. The broad consensus view holds that the most important long-run impact of international 
trade and investment has been to raise average real wages without undermining the aggregate employment base, thus providing substantial 
payoffs to all countries in the aggregate. Indeed, conservatively estimated, about one fifth of the increase in living standards in the EU-15 
over the past 50 years is the result of our integration in the world economy – and there is nothing in the historical record to suggest that this 
has come at the expense of higher levels of unemployment. The rapid global economic change we are now witnessing offers the prospect of 
further gains in living standards. As in the past, these could come from lower prices for consumers and firms, greater volumes of 
international trade, higher levels of productivity and real wages, and a wider choice of products. However, in order to realise the potential 
gains from globalisation, production structures will have to shift into new areas of comparative advantage, and both economic theory and 
empirical evidence demonstrate that in this process the welfare of some people may be reduced even as aggregate productivity and income 
improve. There is no shortage of individual case studies and anecdotal evidence indicating significant labour market adjustment costs arising 
from intensified international competition for certain groups of the workforce, as reflected in higher job displacement rates and the social 
hardship associated with ensuing long spells of inactivity and unemployment and/or large wage losses once re-employed". 
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(1992) and Romer (1994)
28. Unfortunately the welfare gain from increased variety is 
hard to measure, since standard national accounts price measures underestimate 
quality improvements, linked with factors such as variety.  
 
•  According to the more pessimistic view as presented, for example, by Samuelson 
(2004)
29 as well as Gomory and Baumol (2000), productivity growth in the developing 
world will not simply be confined to the production of goods and services in which 
these countries were specialising in before the productivity take-off. Technological 
progress in the RoW will enable catching-up countries to increase the range of goods 
they produce and to enter markets which were previously dominated by industrialised 
countries. This could make the production of certain goods previously produced in 
industrialised countries obsolete. In simple terms, technological advancement in the 
RoW defined in this way is linked with a shift in demand from goods produced in the 
industrialised regions to goods produced in the catching-up countries. To the extent 
that increased supply is accompanied by increased demand for the goods supplied by 
the catching-up countries, the beneficial terms of trade and demand effects described 
in the optimistic view will be smaller and could even, under certain extreme 
circumstances, be reversed.  
 
The gains from trade were rarely questioned in the decades prior to the 1990’s since over this 
period most trade was of the intra-industry variety (i.e. within industries) rather than inter-
industry (i.e. between industries). With countries essentially specialising in varieties of 
products or quality ranges within the same industry, there was little danger of countries 
having to contemplate closing down large sectors of their industrial capacity. In addition, the 
developed economies did not face any real competition in their core activities which were 
intensive in the use of skilled labour and leading edge technologies. With the re-organisation 
of production on a global basis now increasingly driving world trade growth, and with the 
emergence of new, relatively poor but generally well educated, trading powers such as China, 
India, Russia, Brazil and Mexico, the above mentioned pre-1990 conditions no longer hold. 
 
While the gains from trade and specialisation are potentially very high when the income 
levels of the trading partners are very different (i.e. greater efficiency gains in the allocation 
of resources are possible from specialisation in conditions where there are large differences in 
the cost structures of countries, with consumers gaining through price reductions), the 
adjustment costs (i.e. re-skilling of displaced labour and redeployment of capital to new 
industries) are also very high. These inter-industry adjustment costs are much higher in fact 
than for trade between countries of similar income levels and, without intervention, can raise 
significant distributional concerns. In addition, any shift towards intra-industry trade will take 
time and is to a significant extent dictated by the speed of per capita income convergence. 
Whilst income differences between trading partners in general hinder the shift to intra-
industry trade, there are specific industries, such as ICT and motor vehicles, which have 
experienced a substantial increase in vertically integrated intra-industry trade. 
 
                                                 
28 The Feenstra and Romer studies estimated that eliminating protectionism could increase global welfare by an amount equivalent to 1% of 
GDP. In addition, in studies conducted to evaluate the Internal Market Programme (European Economy, 1996), the trade integration effects 
for the EU were estimated to be in the range of 0.5 - 0.7% of GDP. 
 
29 Samuelson suggests that technological catch-up in emerging economies such as China could lead to adverse shifts in the terms of trade of 
the developed economies and to permanent reductions in their per capita incomes.   33
3.2.2 : How does outsourcing / offshoring affect the various interpretations of 
globalisation ? The last ten years have been characterised by an increase in the trade of 
intermediate goods and services, with the international sourcing of intermediate inputs 
lowering the cost of domestic final production. Increased imports of intermediates, as defined 
earlier, is also known as outsourcing. This phenomenon does not fundamentally alter the 
economic assessment since the general arguments for efficiency gains from trade in final 
goods apply equally to intermediates
30. However, there is one important difference. When 
there is only trade in final goods, the international relocation of production due to changing 
patterns of comparative advantage may go at a faster pace. In contrast, when domestic firms 
can outsource some stages of production to foreign suppliers, the larger use of intermediate 
inputs will often prevent production from moving abroad completely, by allowing firms to 
make use of a more efficient international division of labour. In other words, outsourcing will 
not only reduce costs but it can directly increase the marginal product of domestic factors of 
production (i.e. it can drive up productivity). International sourcing of intermediate inputs (as 
with final goods and services) improves productivity.  
 
This productivity enhancing effect of outsourcing has been the subject of intensive research in 
recent years. Egger and Egger (2001) find that international outsourcing of goods has in fact 
increased the productivity of low skilled workers by over 3% in the EU from 1993 to 1997. 
Also Amiti and Wei (2004) find that services outsourcing in US manufacturing is positively 
correlated with labour productivity (but goods outsourcing has insignificant productivity 
effects). Konings (2004) provides a survey of the employment and productivity effects of 
outsourcing and tries to assess the quantitative importance of services outsourcing. In a recent 
paper Amiti and Wei (2006) estimate the effects of goods and services outsourcing on 
productivity in US manufacturing industries between 1992 and 2000 and find that services 
offshoring accounted for 11% of productivity growth over this period compared with an effect 
of 5% for goods imports.  
 
The effects of offshoring will not just be confined to productivity, with income distribution 
and terms of trade effects also to be expected. A large part of the literature is concerned with 
the wage premium of high skilled workers. For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) 
attribute between 17 ½ - 40% of the increase in the wage premium of non-production (i.e. 
"skilled") workers to outsourcing. Given that services outsourcing may on average be more 
skill intensive than the outsourcing of material inputs the effects of services outsourcing on 
the wage skill premium could be even greater, with potentially significant effects on the 
relative wages and / or employment of low-skilled workers. Finally, Mann (2004) argues that 
international outsourcing in IT production has led to a fall in IT prices of between 10% to 
30%. 
 
                                                 
30 Trade in intermediates (a healthy, mutually beneficial, process of efficiency sharing between countries) complicates an assessment of 
globalisation but does not fundamentally alter it. Firstly, a distinction has to be made between domestic output and domestic value added / 
income. The optimistic and pessimistic views extend directly to domestic output in that the effects of both are broadly comparable. However, 
there can be differences regarding domestic value added (i.e. GDP) due to the efficiency gains which may accrue from the use of 
intermediate inputs (i.e. in addition to the gains from the traditional factors of production, capital and labour). Any efficiency gains would 
take the form of an outward shift of the production frontier for final goods, with the increased variety or quality of inputs boosting 
productivity. If one takes, for example, a terms of trade loss in the developing world (as a consequence of an increase in productivity). This 
has two opposing effects on developed economies. First there is a negative substitution effect at the expense of domestic factors of 
production from the outsourcing which occurs. As against this, outsourcing has the potential to enhance the productivity of domestic factors 
of production i.e. capital and labour. This productivity enhancing effect is however only applicable to intermediate not final goods since if a 
factory producing final goods closes due to an increase in global competition, this has no offsetting effects in terms of productivity. Finally, 
there is a third effect to be considered. If capital is mobile, outsourcing is not necessarily combined with an increase in labour productivity 
since the increase in intermediates is compensated for by a loss of capital. Consequently the overall impact of outsourcing is ambiguous, with 
the final effect dictated by the relative strength of the above-mentioned factors.   34
3.2.3 : Short versus long run effects of globalisation
31 : The discussion so far refers 
essentially to the long run effects of globalisation i.e. to a situation where a new equilibrium 
(both external and internal) among the main trading partners has been reached and the terms 
of trade have been adjusted (i.e. a new equilibrium characterised by increased trade and 
technological convergence is established at the global level). This is a situation where EU 
exports would benefit on the demand side from high income in the RoW and both consumers 
and investors would benefit from gains in the terms of trade. What can be said about the 
transitional gains or losses and how long will the transition to this new equilibrium last ?  
 
Can one safely assume that there will be a smooth transition from the short to the long run ? 
Not necessarily, even if one holds the view that globalisation will be welfare improving in the 
long run, there could still be short run negative effects for economically advanced regions 
such as the EU15, especially in circumstances where policy makers fail to respond 
appropriately. There is certainly a positive demand effect because of higher rest of the world 
imports, especially of EU investment goods which is beneficial in the short run. However, 
catching up in the developing world also offers higher returns for physical investment in these 
regions and is likely to direct international investment flows away from the developed to the 
emerging market economies. This could temporarily lower investment rates at home and 
productivity growth could suffer temporarily from a decreased rate of capital accumulation, 
with negative effects on real wage growth. This could have additional negative effects on 
consumption. Of course these short run negative effects could be significantly attenuated if 
policy makers were to respond with measures aimed at maintaining the EU’s attractiveness as 
a place for innovation and investment. More specifically, action is needed to enhance the 
EU’s capacity to produce and commercialize a flow of world class innovative technologies 
and to create an investment environment conducive to the imitation and absorption of 
externally available know-how. 
 
HISTORICAL AND FUTURE GAINS
DEVELOPED WORLD VIEWPOINTS ON THE PRESENT PHASE OF GLOBALISATION
(Characterised by income / technological convergence of developing world)
EU’s historical gains from 
globalisation have been large 
(20% of the increase in 
per capita incomes)
Short vs Long Run
Need to distinguish between 
the short-run transition / 
restructuring costs of 
globalisation and realising the 
long run benefits of the 
process in the EU by having 
smooth adjustment 
mechanisms + a Lisbon 
inspired productivity agenda
GLOBALISATION DEBATE
Outsourcing stages of the 
production process to foreign 
suppliers reduces costs; 
increases the productivity of 
domestic factors of 
production (i.e. it leads to a 
more efficient international 
division of labour) & 
increases the demand for 
skilled labour
Mainstream Optimistic View
Productivity increases in developing countries 
are welfare improving for the developed world 
due to positive spillovers from :
1. Terms of trade gains
2. Higher demand for developed world exports 
of goods and services
3. Increased variety & quality of imported goods
4. Increased productivity from sectoral 
restructuring & from the absorption of 
externally generated technological progress 
(i.e. new knowledge)
Pessimistic View
Increased productivity / supply in developing 
world is accompanied by increased demand for 
goods produced by the catching-up countries. 
This leads to the possibility that 
1. The expected terms of trade / export gains for 
the developed world could be very small or 
even negative
2. Adverse shifts in import penetration ratios / 
stagnant domestic demand patterns takes place
3. FDI outflows in transition phase
 
                                                 
31 In general, the short run is characterised by winners, losers and adjustment costs, with the long run gains emerging once the displaced 























QUANTIFYING THE MACRO BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GLOBALISATION FOR THE EU  
(1990-2050) 
 
   36
Section 4. Indicator based assessment of the benefits and costs of globalisation : 1990-
2003 
 
Following the broad based nature of the evaluation of globalisation trends and issues in 
sections 2 and 3, the present section will focus on the specificities of the post-1990 
acceleration in globalisation. The big question to be addressed is whether the EU is still 
gaining from globalisation, as we did in the post-war period, with the trends for a number of 
key indicators being analysed to make a, partial equilibrium, assessment of the gains and 
losses. This indicator-based section should be seen as an introduction to the general 
equilibrium simulations in section 5 where the insights provided from the present section are 
used to quantify the macroeconomic benefits and costs of globalisation over the 1991-2003 
period as well as providing the essential empirical inputs for the longer run simulations to 
2050.  
 
What does the empirical evidence suggest regarding the present effects of globalisation. 
Unfortunately there is no direct way of deciding whether the optimistic or pessimistic view of 
globalisation laid out in section 3.2 better fits the facts. All we can do is examine whether the 
evolution of certain macroeconomic variables is more consistent with one view or the other. 
The earlier theoretical discussion suggested that there are a number of macroeconomic 
indicators which are important for assessing the benefits and costs of globalisation. The 
optimists expect positive spillovers from rising terms of trade in the currently industrialised 
economies, from the additional boost to exports and from the productivity gains induced by 
sectoral restructuring and from the absorption of externally produced technological progress 
(i.e. new knowledge). Sceptics would regard adverse shifts in import and domestic demand 
patterns as alarm signals, with the present EU pattern of increasing import penetration rates 
and stagnant domestic demand trends being a case in point. In addition, sceptics point to FDI 
outflows being detrimental (at least over a transition phase) for domestic productivity.  
 
The present section provides information about the basic stylised facts concerning the most 
relevant macroeconomic indicators, showing both the magnitude of the change in the latter as 
well as (as far as this is possible) the trend change since the beginning of the 1990s. Careful 
interpretation is needed given that these indicators are influenced by a wide range of factors, 
only some of which are related to globalisation. This section presents the trends for most of 
these variables since the beginning of the 1990s for the EU15, US and a “rest of the world” 
(RoW) grouping. Focussing only on these 3 areas is useful in establishing a clear 
understanding of the main transmission channels and it also mirrors the 3-way breakdown 
used for the model simulations in section 5. However, given the heterogeneity of the RoW 
grouping, most of the graphs also contain data for specific countries in the RoW grouping, 
most notably China given the increasingly large role which this country is playing in shaping 
overall RoW developments. These indicators are discussed under the following headings in 
sections 4.1 - 4.5 : 
 
•  Global Relocation of Production Processes : Outsourcing, offshoring and global 
demand shifts (4.1) 
•  Trade Integration and the threat of China (4.2) 
•  R&D trends : Globalisation of Technology Production and Diffusion (4.3) 
•  Terms of Trade Developments (4.4) 
•  Global productivity and per capita income trends (4.5)   37
4.1 : Global Relocation of Production Processes :  
Outsourcing, offshoring and global demand shifts 
 
In terms of evaluating the relative merits of the optimistic / pessimistic positions on 
globalisation, an understanding of global relocation is essential. Here one must be careful 
with the definition one uses. As explained earlier, we define global relocation as being made 
up of three distinct elements. The first two elements summarise the voluntary relocation by 
domestic firms to foreign countries of a wide range of activities via firstly, outsourcing (i.e. 
the contracting out of parts of the production process to foreign suppliers) and secondly, 
offshoring which is moving production abroad by setting up foreign subsidiaries. The third 
element of relocation reflects the involuntary transfer of activities abroad such as the closure 
or scaling down of complete industries or parts of industries in a certain location in favour of 
another (e.g. textiles) or the emergence of new industries (e.g. ICT). At the theoretical level, 
we know that the effects of global relocation are ambiguous, with positive efficiency gains, 
negative substitution effects and potentially negative effects from capital outflows.  
 
In empirical terms, global relocation can be roughly measured by firstly looking at trade data 
i.e. changes in intermediate goods and services imports (which can be used as a proxy for 
outsourcing), secondly, by examining shifts in the FDI component of capital flows (for the 
offshoring part of relocation) and by looking at import penetration ratios / growth rate 
differentials to assess changes in the demand for domestic and foreign produced goods and 
services, which is what we use to measure the third, involuntary, element of this phenomenon. 
 
Outsourcing : In terms of outsourcing, on the basis of our definition, graph 8 reiterates the 
point made earlier in section 2.2.2 that the overall world outsourcing market was equivalent to 
11 ¼ % of world GDP in 2003, an increase of roughly 3% points since the early 1990’s. In 
terms of the EU’s outsourcing market, graph 9a shows that while the total EU outsourcing 
market is significantly larger than for the world as a whole (i.e. 14 ¾% vs. 11 ¼% of GDP in 
2003), the increase of 3 percentage points since 1992 was identical. Consequently the EU and 
world economies have both experienced relatively large increases in outsourcing over the 
period, with this growth reflecting both increased trade in intermediate goods and in 
intermediate (essentially business) services.  
 
In terms of assessing the overall gains and losses for the EU from outsourcing, graph 9b gives 
the trends for the net balance on intermediate goods and services (i.e. after allowing for both 
export and import developments). This graph shows that while our imports of intermediates 
has clearly been rising, we have also been exporting a lot of these goods and services. In net 
terms, the EU has had a consistent surplus on intermediate goods and services trade over the 
period 1992 to 2003, with this surplus in fact rising over time from 0.5% of GDP in 1992 to 
1.4% in 2003. This growing surplus is also broadly based with the EU enjoying positive trade 
balances in terms of both intermediate goods and intermediate services. This data is at least 
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Graph 8 : Global Outsourcing Market (1992-2003) 
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Source : World Development Indicators (World Bank), UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
Graph 9 : EU15 Outsourcing Market  
(Intermediate Imports of Goods and Services + Net trade balance on intermediates) 
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Source : UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
Offshoring :  A knowledge of capital flows, especially the net position in terms of FDI, is 
important to assess the domestic investment implications of globalisation. Stocks of foreign 
capital as a share of world GDP have increased dramatically since the early 1980’s, with the 
pace accelerating even more in the 1990’s. FDI constitutes a big part of these flows over the 
last 10-15 years, with the inward stock of FDI rising from around 9% of world GDP in 1990 
to close to 23% in 2003. This FDI trend for the 1990’s marks a big change relative to the 
1980’s where the increase was much more subdued (i.e. from 6 ½% to 9% of world GDP).  
While the EU, US and the ROW all experienced sharp increases in the share of inward FDI as 
a percentage of GDP since the early 1990’s, the net positions tell a very different story. As 
can be seen from Graph 10a, the net positions for the EU and the US deteriorated significantly 
over this period. From a position of broad balance in the early part of the 1990’s, net FDI 
outflows from the EU reached over 9% of EU GDP in 2001 before falling back somewhat in 
2002 and 2003
32. This trend marks a significant break with the 1980’s where the EU was in 
either broad balance or slight deficit (i.e. of the order of 1 to 1 ½ % of GDP).  For the US, the 
deterioration in its net stock position was less severe compared with the EU. In addition, its 
net deficits of 3-4 % of GDP in the 1990’s were not totally out of line with its experiences in 
the 1980’s, at least in the early part of that decade. Finally, regarding the ROW, graph 10a 
shows that the net inward stock of FDI has increased significantly over the 1990’s and has 
continued to grow in the early years of the present century to reach a level of over 8% of 
GDP. A significant part of the increase over this period has been due to the opening up of 
                                                 
32 The vast majority of EU15 FDI outflows are  to other developed economies, most notably the US.   39
China, where the net stock of FDI has grown from around 5% of GDP in the early 1990’s to 
over 30% in recent years.      
 
Regarding the EU15's net outflows, graph 10b shows the EU outflows and inflows as well as 
the net position. While the net outward stock has reached over 9% of GDP (i.e. well over 
€800 billion), it is important to stress that this is firstly only a very small fraction of the EU’s 
total capital stock of around 300% of GDP and secondly at least part of this gap reflects 
horizontal FDI outflows which aim to absorb and acquire new technologies abroad rather than 
“vertical FDI” which is often directed at exploiting low labour costs through the 
internationalisation of production. 
 
Graph 10 : Net Stocks of FDI for the EU, US and Rest of World (1991-2003) + Inflows, 
Outflows and Net Stocks for EU15 (1991-2003) 
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Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : OECD and own calculations 
 
Global Demand Shifts : Regarding the third element of relocation, an analysis of overall 
GDP growth rate differentials (graph 11) and of world import demand patterns (graph 12) 
would suggest that import penetration ratios for goods and services have increased more 
strongly for the EU
33, compared with the rest of the world. A notable exception to the latter 
generalisation (within the rest of the world grouping) is China which has experienced a large 
increase in its import penetration ratio relative to the world average, reflecting the high import 
content of many of its successful export industries.  
 
















Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : WDI and Ameco 
                                                 
33 This increase should not be dismissed as totally negative since it is generally accepted in economics that the real gains from trade are to be 
found in importing not exporting.   40
Graph 12 : Demand Shifts - Import Penetration Ratios : Non-Oil Import Market 
Shares*  (1991-2003) 
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* Refers to external trade between the 3 areas and is measured as imports as a share of domestic demand (EU15 
= Extra EU15) 
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and own calculations 
 
Potential Shifts in Preferences towards Foreign Goods and Services : Is the optimistic or 
pessimistic view of globalisation supported by looking at the development of import 
penetration ratios ? The import penetration ratios presented in Graph 12 are suggestive of a 
shift in preferences towards goods produced in the rest of the world. The evolution of import 
shares in fact provide a direct estimate of import demand shifts in the three regions under the 
assumption that the price elasticity of imports is equal to one. Empirical estimates for this 
elasticity suggest values larger than one
34. Given, as we will see later in this section, that the 
terms of trade has improved for the EU (i.e. the price elasticity of imports is not equal to one), 
the actual shift of preferences for foreign goods is larger than indicated by the change in the 
import share (i.e. the demand shift in favour of imports is being underestimated by the 
evolution of the import share). This view is supported by the empirical evidence from the 
trade regressions in Annex 3 which show that the imports of country 1 from country 2 depend 
positively on growth in country 2. As noted by Krugman (1988), there is a systematic link 
between international growth rate differentials and demand elasticities for imports. Recently 
Gagnon (2004) has shown that this is consistent with models of technical change where 
increases in TFP are positively linked to product innovations (i.e. ROW produces goods 
which are increasingly demanded in the developed world). This enables ROW countries to 
offer products on the world market which so far have been exclusively supplied by the more 
developed economies.  
 
Thus the development of import market shares over the last 10-15 years are not inconsistent 
with the view that technical progress in the rest of the world has led to stronger international 
product competition and to market share gains for the rest of the world in markets previously 
dominated by the EU and the US. In terms of longer term patterns, while import penetration 
rates have increased, the most discernible shift is in the composition of trade, with imports of 
capital and intermediate goods (most notably parts and components) and of high technology 
products now constituting a higher share of overall imports.  Consequently, the 1990’s have 
experienced not only an acceleration in international economic integration but also a change 
                                                 
34 For an elasticity larger than one, the import share underestimates the true demand shift in a specific country if its terms of trade are 
increasing and vice versa.   41
in the nature of integration towards the globalisation of production processes, most notably in 
the ICT and car industries.  
    
Conclusion on Global Relocation : It is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from the 
outsourcing, offshoring and demand shift graphs in the present section regarding the overall 
macroeconomic significance of the production relocation phenomenon. Such an assessment 
will be made later on, using model simulations, in section 5. However, graphs 8-12 do 
provide a type of partial equilibrium analysis which acts as a useful complement to the 
general equilibrium assessment which will be made using the simulations. The overall 
impression created by the graphical analysis is of the EU more than holding its own in terms 
of outsourcing; of the EU's net FDI position being negative but the size and nature of the 
outflows are not alarming; and finally, in terms of global demand shifts that the EU is not 
responding well to the globalisation induced heightening in competition levels and in the 
accelerated pace of technological change. 
 
1. Voluntary Relocation
1. World & EU 
outsourcing market has 
grown by 3% points of 
GDP (1992-2003)
2. Roughly 50% of 
increase comes from 
intermediate business 
services + 50% from 
intermediate goods
3. EU’s surplus on 
intermediates trade has 
grown from 0.5% of GDP 
in 1992 to 1.4% in 2003 
(i.e. from €31 billion to 
€133 billion)
Outsourcing
(Measured by changes in 
intermediate imports of 
goods & services)
Global Relocation (2 Main Channels)
2. Involuntary Relocation
Offshoring
(Measured by shifts in 
the FDI component of 
capital flows)
Global Demand Shifts
(Measured by import 
penetration ratios / growth 
rate differentials)
1. Stock of FDI rose from 
9% of world GDP in 1990 
to close to 23% in 2003
2. EU net FDI outflows 
deteriorated significantly 
over the 1990's to reach 
9% of GDP in 2001. 
However, these outflows 
are small compared with 
the value of the EU’s 
total capital stock and 
some outflows are 
technology seeking
3. China’s net FDI 
inflows rose from 5% of 
GDP to over 30% over 
the 1990's
1. Import penetration ratios 
are tending to rise in the 
EU & fall in the rest of the 
world (ROW) which is 
suggestive of a shift in 
preferences towards goods 
produced in ROW
2. Technical progress in 
ROW has led to stronger 
international product 
competition and to market 
share gains for ROW 
producers at the expense 
of developed world 
producers 
Conclusions for EU
1. Outsourcing : EU more than holding its own (in fact it is gaining)
2. Offshoring : Net FDI outflows have occurred but size & nature are not alarming
3. Global demand shifts : EU not responding well to the globalisation induced heightening in 
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4.2 : Trade Integration and the threat of China
35 
 
Higher export volumes constitute one of the most visible indicators of the gains from 
globalisation and the evidence is that the EU is generally holding its own in extra-EU15 world 
markets. As graph 13 shows, the EU is the world's number one trading power, with changes to 
its overall market share performance since the early 1990's comparing favourably with that of 
the US and Japan. This global domination, to a large extent, reflects the fact that the EU is the 
market leader in a wide range of medium technology and capital intensive goods industries. 
Despite this, there are a number of areas of concern regarding the medium to long run trends 
for the EU. In terms of new competitors, as we will see in more detail later on in this section, 
China and the Asia region in general pose a considerable competitive threat to the EU. Over 
the 1990’s, the EU has experienced large and rising deficits with Asia in its overall trade and 
has experienced sharp turnarounds in its trading performance in a number of product areas 
which have traditionally been EU strongholds. In terms of a skills-based breakdown of 
product groupings, while the EU has a strong specialisation in the medium-high technology 
area, it is exceptionally weak in a large number of high technology export markets, especially 
in the ICT area. In overall terms, the speed of the changes in certain product categories and 
the EU’s inexplicably large gap in specific high technology areas suggest that complacency 
based on the relatively good 1990’s performance would be a serious mistake. 
 
Graph 13 : Export Market Shares*   (1991-2003) 











* EU15's world market share excludes intra-EU15 trade 
Source : UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
"Threat" to EU from the integration of China into the World Economy : Graph 13 
confirms the emergence of China as a significant player in global markets. While this process 
of integration into the world's trading system will undoubtedly be disruptive, from an 
economic point of view the issue is whether this disruption is potentially beneficial or not. To 
examine this question, from the EU's perspective, the text below looks in more detail at 
changes in global trade patterns, examining shifts in the EU's and China's comparative 
advantage over the last 10-15 years and the evidence as to whether China is rapidly moving 
up the value added chain.    
 
                                                 
35 China's influence on the global economy reflects not only the fact that it is large and growing fast but also that it is one of the most open, 
large, economies in the world in terms of inward foreign investment and trade as a % of GDP, with the degree of openness accelerating 
sharply over the 1990's. For example, China's ratio of trade to GDP in 2003 was over 30% compared with 18% for extra-EU15 and 12% for 
the US. In terms of foreign investment, China's net inflows of FDI in 2003 as a % of GDP were nearly 10 times greater than those of the US. 
While the short run adjustment costs of greater openness can be significant for particular sectors, regions and skill groups, the long run, 
economy-wide, productivity gains from company restructuring / reskilling of workers to keep pace with global competition is already 
resulting in dramatic gains in Chinese real wages and per capita incomes.    43
As stressed earlier, the rise of China in world export markets has not, as yet, occurred at the 
expense of the EU, with the US and Japan appearing to be more strongly affected over the 
period 1991-2003. However, while the EU has not experienced large shifts in its overall 
export market share or indeed in its total trade balance position since the early 1990’s, there 
have nevertheless been large changes in terms of the geographical focus of its trade and 
consequently in its market position vis-à-vis its main trading partners.  Since 1992, the US, 
the EU's new Member States (i.e. EU10) and China have become increasingly important 
export markets for the EU15. Changes to the EU15’s overall trade balances shown in graph 
14 indicate large and rising deficits with Asia (including China) compensated by surpluses 
with most other areas of the world. All 3 areas of Asia shown in the graph have opened up 
significant trade gaps with the EU, with the Chinese trade deficit of nearly ½% of GDP at 
similar levels to that of Japan, with whom we have had a persistently large deficit since the 
early 1990’s.  
 





















Source : UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
Comparative Advantage Indicators : Regarding the rising EU trade deficit with China, it is 
important to shed some light on both the nature of the goods which are driving this deficit and 
on the underlying specialisation patterns. In this context, part of the analysis for the present 
section is based on work done for a companion paper on global trade integration (see Havik 
and Mc Morrow 2006 – forthcoming), including the calculation of revealed comparative 
advantages (RCA's) for all the regions of the world, including China and EU15.  
 
Two basic classifications were used for the RCA calculations, one skill based which breaks 
trade in manufactured goods down into the five categories of "high tech", "ICT", "medium 
high tech", "medium low tech", and "low tech". The second classification covers total trade 
and is based on the intensity with which individual products use the different factors of 
production. Here there is a five way breakdown into "difficult to imitate research goods", 
"easy to imitate research goods", "capital intensive goods", "labour intensive goods" and "raw 
material intensive goods".  
 
What do both breakdowns reveal about the respective comparative advantages of the EU and 
the US. Graphs 15a and 15b clearly indicate that there is a large degree of complementarity in 
the trading structures of both areas, with the EU strong in "medium high technology", 
"difficult to imitate research goods" and "capital goods" and with China relatively weak in 
those specific categories. Likewise in areas where China is strong, such as "low tech" and 
"labour intensive goods", the EU is relatively weak. 
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Graph 15a : RCA's* for EU15 for different skill and factor intensity categories 
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Graph 15b : RCA's* for China for different skill and factor intensity categories 
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Source : UN Comtrade, CEPII and own calculations 
* Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
EU-China trade at the product level : While RCA breakdowns of trade into specific skill or 
factor intensity groupings are enlightening, it is important to supplement this with an 
overview at the product level. Given that the 3 digit "Standard International Trade 
Classification" (SITC) includes a total of 266 products, the analysis in Havik and Mc Morrow 
(2006) focuses only on the top 20 contributors to the growth of global trade (see Table 1). As 
the table shows, calculating the top 20 products at the world level involved taking the export 
growth rate for each product and multiplying it with its overall share in total non-fuel exports 
to calculate its respective contribution. Table 1 shows the top 20 products derived from this 
exercise. This list of the most dynamic export products represents nearly 40% of total non-
fuel world trade and over 50% of the growth rate in non-fuel exports over the 1994-2003 
period. These 20 products are heavily concentrated in the "medium high tech", "high tech" 
and "research intensive" goods categories, indicating that there is a clear shift in world 
demand towards these high skill intensive products over the last decade.  If one examines the 
world market shares for the EU, US and China for the top 6 products (graphs 16a-16c), two 
important conclusions emerge : 
 
•  Firstly, that while the EU is broadly holding its own in many of these markets, its 
share of ICT related product markets (i.e. semiconductors; computers; and parts and 
accessories for computers) is often relatively small; and  
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•  Secondly, that China is largely absent from the passenger cars and pharmaceuticals 
markets, areas where the EU is very strong. China would appear to be more of a 
competitor to the US in many of the ICT related areas where the US has traditionally 
held a strong comparative advantage. One exception however is telecommunications 
where China is gaining market share from both the US and the EU. 
 
Table 1 : 20 Largest Contributors to World Non-Fuel Export Growth 1994-2003* 
1994-2003   
Rank 
 
Product Group  Non-Fuel Export 
Growth Rate 
Share in Non-Fuel 
World Exports 
% Contribution to 
Non-Fuel Export 
Growth 
1 Semiconductors  13.6 4.4  7.8 
2 Passenger  Cars  8.4 5.6 6.0 
3 Telecommunications 
Equipment 
12.5 3.3  5.4 
4 Computers  10.0 3.3  4.3 
5  Parts and Accessories for Computers   10.8 2.5  3.5 
6 Pharmaceuticals  17.6 1.5  3.4 
7  Parts and Accessories for Motor 
Vehicles 
7.7 2.6 2.6 
8 Electrical  Circuits  10.0 1.5  2.0 
9 Electrical  Machinery  8.9 1.7 1.9 
10 Aircraft  6.6 1.9 1.7 
11 Measuring  Equipment  8.5 1.2 1.4 
12 Chemicals  12.9 0.8  1.3 
13 Furniture  9.3 1.1 1.3 
14 Piston  Engines  8.1 1.2 1.3 
15  Paper and Paperboard  6.9 1.3 1.2 
16 Specialised  Equipment  7.3 1.2 1.1 
17 Clothing  7.9 1.1 1.1 
18 Base  Metal  Manufactures  8.8 1.0 1.1 
19 Plastics  8.7 1.0 1.1 
20  Engines and Motors  10.0 0.8  1.0 
Total of Top 20  9.6 39.1  50.4   
 







Source : UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
 
Graph 16a : World Export Market Shares : Semiconductors + Passenger Cars 
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Graph 16b : World Export Market Shares : Telecommunications + Computers 

























Graph 16c : World Export Market Shares : Computer Parts + Pharmaceuticals 



























Source : UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
Is China advancing rapidly in terms of technology ? : A key question for EU policy 
makers is whether China is rapidly moving up the value added chain ? We have seen already 
that the RCA’s for China show a strong focus on low-skilled and labour intensive sectors. 
This however seems inconsistent with the analysis of the top 6 industries showing China with 
a growing world share in a range of ICT related industries, many of which are classified as 
high technology. This apparent inconsistency is why one needs to go beyond simple market 
shares to assess the real threat from China. In fact a number of factors suggest that the RCA 
analysis rather than trends in export market shares provides a more accurate reflection of the 
extent of technological progress in China. The following factors would point strongly to the 
conclusion that while China may be exporting high technology products, it is nevertheless 
focussed on the labour intensive stages of the production of such goods
36 : 
 
•  Firstly, China is only able to export huge volumes of ICT products because it imports 
almost all of the high value added parts and components that go into these products. 
China is just an assembler of such goods (i.e. not a manufacturer in the traditional 
sense), with the domestic value added of these products only representing 15% of the 
export value, the rest is import content. To put this 15% into context, the ECB has 
estimated that in 2000 the Euro Area domestic value added figure was over 55%. 
 
                                                 
36 The following four bullet points draw heavily on the work of N. Lardy (2005)   47
•  Secondly, most of the ICT products which China produces (DVD players, notebook 
computers, mobile telephones) cannot be considered high tech. If one looks at the 
huge export volumes and low unit prices of these products, these should not be 
included in the high technology category.   
 
•  Thirdly, most exports of ICT products are assembled not by Chinese-owned firms but 
by foreign firms (especially Taiwanese) that are using China as an export platform.  
 
•  Fourthly, these foreign firms tend to protect their technology from Chinese 
competitors thereby limiting the diffusion of technology to indigenous Chinese firms. 
These latter indigenous firms also appear to spend very little on R&D to develop new 
technologies on their own.  
 
Concluding Remarks : In overall terms, section 4.2 has shown that the EU is broadly 
holding its own on world markets despite the growing presence of China. It has also 
underlined the strong complementarities in the structure of Chinese / EU trade (as reflected in 
the comparative advantage indicators) as well as the very little evidence which exists, at the 
present time at least, to support the view that China is a growing technological powerhouse. 
However, despite this relatively reassuring assessment, there are a number of potential risks 
for the EU.  
 
•  Firstly, while the EU has done reasonably well over the last 10-15 years in 
maintaining its leading role in world trade, this performance may reflect a certain 
element of good fortune given that the initial, investment intensive, phase of the global 
catching-up process tends to benefit those capital goods industries where the EU is 
relatively strong.  
 
•  Secondly, the EU’s exceptionally poor performance in the high technology sector, and 
ICT in particular, is a major source of concern especially given the evidence that 
China is anxious to rapidly move up the value added chain (and is investing heavily in 
R&D and education to hasten this process).  
 
•  Thirdly, given the estimates of over 100 million low skilled agricultural workers in 
China needing to move into the manufacturing sector over the coming decades, it 
appears that China’s comparative advantage is likely to remain in labour intensive 
products for many years.  Given that the EU has a relatively high share of its exports 
in the low technology / labour intensive categories compared with the US or Japan, it 
is particularly vulnerable to the almost inevitable world domination by China (or other 
low cost producers) in these industries.  
 
•  Finally, unlike the last 10-15 years when China tended to focus its export strategy on 
ICT related products
37 as well as textiles / clothing, it is very likely that in future 
phases of their development that they may well target some of the industries where the 
EU is presently dominant, such as cars, chemicals or pharmaceuticals
38.   
                                                 
37 Globalisation has helped to stimulate the consumer uptake of ICT products such as computers and mobile phones. Cheap assembly plants 
in a number of emerging Asian countries, using expensive high technology components from the US and Europe, have both combined to 
keep the price of these products affordable. 
38 This is already starting to happen and it is perhaps ominous to note that 2005 was the first year that China recorded a surplus on its motor 
vehicle trade.   48
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4.3 : R&D Flows : Globalisation of Technology Production and Diffusion 
 
As with trade and capital flows, the 1990’s has also experienced a substantial increase in the 
flow of technology across borders. This flow is made up of two essential elements, the 
internationalisation of R&D activities (4.3.1) and the global diffusion of “ready-to-use” 
technologies from “inventor” countries to “applicant” countries in the form of patents and 
licensing agreements (4.3.2).   
 
4.3.1 : Internationalisation of Technology Production : Graph 17a indicates that while the 
overall R&D intensities of economies did not change dramatically over the period 1991-2003 
(with perhaps the notable exceptions of Japan and China
39), there was a definite shift in terms 
of the domestic / international split of research expenditures. Although the largest proportion 
of R&D is still done at home, the internationalisation of R&D activities is developing rapidly 
and is mainly carried out by large, technology-intensive, multinational firms. According to the 
OECD’s “Globalisation Indicators”, R&D performed abroad by OECD companies amounted 
to over 16 ½% of total business sector R&D in 2001. As graph 17b indicates, this represents 
almost a 40% increase compared with the equivalent share in 1993. This growth shows that 
the progressive international relocation of R&D facilities is fast becoming a key element in 
the overall process of economic globalisation.  
 
                                                 
39 High R&D spending in China is however very different from the development of commercially viable innovative products as recognised 
by G. De Jonquieres (Financial Times July 2006) "Although Chinese science is developing rapidly, as reflected in growing numbers of patent 
filings, the country's efforts to translate  ideas into commercially successful innovations have so far been disappointing. Many structural 
barriers stand in the way. They include an ivory tower approach to engineering education; weak links between universities and business; 
academic corruption; ineffective intellectual property protection; state-owned industries' domination of large markets and scarcity of venture 
capital funding. Many of these handicaps are deep-seated and will require bold action to dislodge".   49
Graph 17 : Total R&D expenditures + International Share of Business Sector R&D 










17a : R&D Expenditure (1991 + 2003)
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Source : OECD 
 
Who are the key players ? : R&D internationalisation has traditionally been an intra-TRIAD 
phenomenon, with the EU, but especially the US, being major locations for foreign R&D. 
However, more recently, this phenomenon has become more truly global, with many 
emerging economies becoming important locations for internationally mobile R&D facilities. 
A 2004 survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit showed, for example, that the favourite 
locations for planned R&D investments were China, followed by the US and India.  
 
This more global focus for R&D spending can be seen in the increasing diversification of the 
US’s own outward R&D investments. US firms are targeting all major regions of the globe 
and especially Asia, with the result that the EU15’s share in total US outward R&D has been 
declining since the late 1990’s. These trends are expected to persist as the new global market 
players continue to build up their science and technology infrastructures and to open up their 
markets to foreign entrants. 
 
Why is R&D increasingly flowing across borders ? : The growing internationalisation of the 
R&D function is being driven by both demand and supply side factors : 
 
•  Firstly, on the demand side, by the establishment of R&D laboratories by 
multinational firms outside their home countries to serve and support their overseas 
production units and marketing activities – relocation of R&D facilities is therefore 
closely linked with the relocation of production, both of which have progressed 
steadily since the early 1990’s. 
 
•  Secondly, on the supply side, there is an acceleration in the setting up of international 
R&D networks and alliances between firms and various public sector research bodies, 
including universities and government research institutes. 
 
The empirical evidence on the respective importance of these different drivers suggests that 
the technology sourcing, supply-side, motives have over the last 20 years become a major 
impulse for firms locating R&D abroad, especially amongst more developed economies. 
Demand side motives (e.g. closeness to local markets) continue however to be an important 
driver, most notably towards the emerging economies.  
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This shift in the international innovation strategies of firms towards technology sourcing is of 
course linked to, and nurtured by, the broader process of globalisation. Up until the mid-
1980’s, as explained earlier, the R&D strategies of transnational corporations were essentially 
demand driven i.e. as firms increasingly located their production closer to their customers and 
suppliers, they needed R&D laboratories in those markets to adapt the technologies and 
products developed at home to local conditions.  After the mid-1980’s, spurred on by the 
increase in competition unleashed by the new phase of globalisation, more supply related 
motives were starting to influence multinationals in establishing foreign R&D facilities. These 
motives included the need to effectively tap into foreign sources of knowledge and 
technology in centres of scientific excellence located worldwide. This was expected to both 
increase the efficiency of the firm’s own R&D processes and to provide channels for the 
absorption of technological spillovers from the local public knowledge base. Spillovers were 
expected to include information from other R&D firms / institutions and access to trained 
personnel and to leading edge universities or government institutions. These supply-driven 
R&D facilities tended to be more focussed on the long-term basic research of the firms 
involved, with collaboration with researchers / institutes in similar fields of research a key 
objective of the internationalisation process. 
 
This shift in the innovation strategies of multinationals is already starting to reflect itself in 
the relative attractiveness of individual countries as locations for the different forms of 
research facilities. Technology-oriented research activities (the “R” part of R&D) tend to be 
located in those countries with relatively high scientific and technological skills and where 
there are world class research institutes and universities and opportunities for public-private 
partnerships. Market-oriented / more development types of R&D activities (i.e. the “D” part 
of R&D) are attracted to countries offering strategic market access.  
 
Given this shift in strategies, it is perhaps not surprising to find that since the mid-1990’s the 
US has become a more attractive location for internationally mobile R&D operations. As 
table 2 indicates, the US has a rapidly expanding share of total internationally mobile R&D 
expenditures, with the latter increasing at between 10-15 percent on an annual average basis. 
The US has many of the key locational determinants needed to attract such mobile R&D 
flows, especially of the technology seeking variety, including a globally-envied third level 
education system and a proven innovation capacity. It is perhaps interesting to note that a 
large part of the US’s expanding global share of mobile R&D spending is due to the activities 
of EU multinationals having research-focussed affiliates on US territory.  
 
Table 2 : Shares of Mobile World Research Expenditures 
 1987  1995  1997  1999 
FRANCE 4  6  5  4 
GERMANY 10  10  8  7 
UK 7  5  4  4 
JAPAN 32  34  27  21 
US 47  45  56  64 
TOTAL 100  100  100  100 
GROWTH RATES IN GLOBAL R&D EXPENDITURES 
1987-1995 1995-1997 1997-1999   








Source : Conference Board, OECD Science and Technology Database.   51
4.3.2 : International Diffusion of Knowledge : In line with the general trend towards the 
internationalisation of the research activities of firms, an increasing share of the technology 
produced in countries, in the form of patents etc, is owned or co-owned by foreign residents / 
firms. The OECD estimates foreign ownership of domestic inventions to be around 15% of 
the total in most countries.  
 
Furthermore, firms are not only developing innovations internationally, they are also 
exploiting their innovations on world markets, through licensing their technologies or selling 
their innovations to foreign purchasers. Directly buying or selling technology on international 
markets is reflected in the balance of payments statistics, with intra-firm technology transfers 
(i.e. between parent companies and their international affiliates) dominating the transactions.  
 
As an indicator, the technology balance of payments reflects a country’s ability to sell its 
disembodied technology abroad and the extent to which it makes use of foreign technologies. 
Deficits / surpluses need therefore to be carefully interpreted since they can reflect a wide 
range of factors including a country’s degree of technological autonomy, its ability / inability 
to assimilate foreign technologies or its high / low levels of technology imports / exports. 
Ultimately, a country’s technological development reflects the choice between domestic 
production of technology / inventions (via a high national R&D effort) or foreign absorption 
(via the acquisition of foreign technologies and the payment of licensing fees and royalties). 
 
These balance of payments statistics are indicating that in parallel with the increasing cross-
border ownership of technology, a sharp upward movement has occurred in the amount of 
technological receipts and payments made by countries over the 1990’s in the form of licence 
fees and royalties (i.e. payments for production-ready technologies, not R&D). For example, 
average EU receipts and payments linked with international technology transfers rose from 
less than ½% of EU GDP in 1991 to over ¾ of a % in 2003. However, as graph 18 shows, the 
EU’s overall technological balance of payments was in persistent deficit throughout the 
period, unlike the situation for the US, Japan and the OECD area as a whole which remained 
net technology exporters to the rest of the world.  
 
Graph 18 : Technology Balance of Payments – 1993 + 2003 














Source : OECD 
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Global R&D Flows
Global Diffusion of « Ready-to-use » Technologies
(Patents + Licensing Agreements)
16 ½% of total business 
sector R&D was done 
abroad in 2001
(40% increase in 8 years)  Demand Side 
R&D to support overseas 
production units & 
marketing activities (D 
part of R&D)
Globalisation of Technology Production & Diffusion
Growing internationalisation of the R&D function is driven by the 
activities of multinationals and reflects both demand and supply side 
factors
Supply Side
Technology seeking R&D 
to tap into foreign sources 
of knowledge / technology 
in centres of scientific 
excellence via R&D 
networks & public / private 
sector alliances (R part of 
R&D – US is big winner)
Firms are increasingly 
exploiting their 
innovations / technologies 
on world markets 
Direct buying or selling of 
technology on 
international markets is 
reflected in Balance of 
Payments (BOP) 
statistics. 
These flows are 
dominated by intra-firm 
technology transfers 
EU’s overall technological 
BOP has been in 
persistent deficit over 
1991-2003 compared with 





4.4 : Terms of Trade Developments 
 
Terms of trade
40 : The welfare effects of globalisation, measured in terms of consumption 
trends, both for the converging and developed regions, are critically dependent on the 
evolution of the terms of trade. Looking at the terms of trade trends in graph 19 (i.e. the 
relative price of exports compared to imports for non-oil goods and services), they seem to 
support the optimistic view of globalisation. In other words, despite the observed productivity 
growth differentials, there has been no demand shift to the ROW, with the technology (i.e. 
supply side) improvements in this region simply leading to lower prices. Both the EU and the 
US show terms of trade gains (when changes in oil prices are excluded) since the mid-1990’s, 
while the rest of the world and China show terms of trade losses. This aggregate level pattern 
is consistent with the view that the relatively advanced economies are more specialised in the 
                                                 
40 An important question for the simulations in section 5 will be how well the various globalisation scenarios can account for the aggregate 
level movements in the terms of trade and for the role played by the underlying technology and demand shocks. In particular, could greater 
changes in the terms of trade have been expected given the relative size of the shocks which occurred ? Since the terms of trade gains suggest 
that the exports of the EU and the US are becoming relatively more valuable on world markets (i.e. we have to export less to receive a given 
quantity of imports), this implies that the EU and the US, in one sense, have become more, not less, competitive on world markets since the 
early 1990's. A gain in competitiveness is defined here to mean that EU and US citizens have the capacity for a sustainable increase in their 
real incomes / standards of living due to globalisation. However, while we are getting richer on average, the problem is that the relative 
incomes of high skilled workers / owners of capital is often rising compared with those of the unskilled (i.e. there is a potential problem in 
terms of the distribution of the gains from globalisation).    53
medium to high tech product areas. This specialisation pattern not surprisingly has given them 
more pricing power compared with the emerging economies which have tended to focus on 
low skilled products / basic commodities or in the labour intensive stages of the production of 
high tech goods (many of which are controlled by foreign multinationals). Graph 19 also 
shows that the EU and even more so the US are gaining strongly relative to China with 
respect to terms of trade developments. These developments tend to support the view, 




Graph 19 : Terms of Trade Developments for Non-Oil Goods and Services : 1991-2003  
















Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and own calculations 
 
EU vs US Terms of Trade Developments : While terms of trade trends between the 
developed and developing world can be rationalised in terms of the relative skill content of 
trade, an interesting additional question is whether the same rationale applies to the growing, 
post-1995, terms of trade differential between the US and EU15. This observation holds even 
when one takes account of exchange rate changes, as the terms of trade indicator itself is not 
sensitive to the currency used for the calculations although the components (i.e. export and 
import prices) are
42. At the aggregate level, the greater US gains reflect the fact that import 
prices have fallen more than export prices compared with the situation in the EU. In addition, 
in dollar terms, US export prices have fallen substantially less than those of the EU. While 
there is undoubtedly an exchange rate element to this export price trend, it may to some extent 
reflect greater US pricing power given its strong comparative advantage in high technology, 
manufactured, goods and in specialised research goods such as semiconductors. Such an 
explanation would also be consistent with the fact that although the US’s global share of 
manufactured goods exports is clearly on the decline, its share of global manufacturing value 
added has risen (graph 20). These contrasting trends for exports and value added are 
suggestive that the US is more advanced than the EU in transferring the low value added parts 
of its manufacturing industries to emerging markets (either via outsourcing or offshoring) 
whilst retaining those parts of the value added chain which have the greatest pricing power.   
. 
 
                                                 
41 The Chinese need to sell several hundred million of their T-shirts into Europe to be able to buy one Airbus from us. 
42 For example, when export and import prices are expressed in US dollars, the general price evolution for all regions clearly points to price 
declines for the 1995-2002 period.   54
 
 
Graph 20 : Shares of global manufacturing value added and manufacturing exports  
1991-2003 
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Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : WDI and own calculations 
 
Graph 21 goes on to show that the increase in the US's high technology export market share at 
the world level was mainly driven by non-ICT products which underlines the diversity within 
the US high technology sector. This growing US focus on high technology segments of the 
market, whilst outsourcing the labour intensive stages of the production of these goods to 
Mexico, Brazil and China, is paying rich dividends for the US. This good terms of trade 
performance for the US shows that one must interpret losses in US export market shares very 
carefully. These losses may reflect both a highly successful outsourcing strategy by US firms 
as well as the proven capacity of the US’s innovation system to not only produce new ideas 
but to commercialise a flow of innovative technologies over the longer term.   
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Source : UN Comtrade and own calculations 
 
Industry Level Terms of Trade : Can industry-specific terms of trade trends help us to 
explain these differences in the post-1995 evolution in the US and the EU ? An analysis of the 
top 20 export product groupings (shown previously in Table 1), using price data supplied by 
CEPII, neither supports nor rejects this thesis, with conflicting results depending on whether 
one measures the terms of trade using world price indices or unit values. The world price 
index data suggests that the EU experienced higher terms of trade gains for the top 20 product 
groupings compared with the US. The EU retained relatively strong pricing power in those 
industries where it has traditionally held a significant global presence, such as in chemicals   55
and pharmaceuticals where prices have remained relatively stable compared with the declines 
experienced elsewhere. In addition, the EU has done well in a number of the capital goods 
industries, the products of which are in strong demand in the initial stages of the catching-up 
processes of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, however, these higher EU gains do not hold 
when world prices are replaced by the specific terms of trade indicators based on unit-values. 
Consequently, this industry level price data gives conflicting signals regarding the direction of 
the aggregate economy-wide trends. This is perhaps not that surprising given that the pricing 
data for sectoral trade categories tends to be very volatile, with specific segments of 
individual categories displaying very different pricing patterns and with individual countries 
specialising in different quality ranges. In addition, it should be stressed that these 20 
groupings represent less than half of all trade in goods and unfortunately no price data exists 
for the service sectors. 
 
Terms of trade trends support the optimistic view of globalisation 
(Technological convergence is mainly leading to lower prices)
EU / US (non-oil) terms of trade  
gains reflect specialisation in 
medium to high technology 
product areas 
China / ROW (non-oil) terms of 
trade losses reflect 
specialisation in low  skilled 
products / basic commodities 
or in the labour intensive 
stages of the production of 
high-technology goods
G reater US pricing pow er in 
high technology goods & in 
specialised research goods 
such as semiconductors
(US’s world export market 
share may be declining but 
its share of global 
manufacturing value added 
has risen)
Terms of trade gains in US are larger than in the EU 
- Possible Explanations
Diversity of US high 
technology sector – increase 
in the US’s export market 
share in high technology 
goods is mainly driven by non-
ICT products
US is more advanced than EU 
in transferring the low value 
added parts of its 
manufacturing industries to 
emerging markets whilst 
retaining those parts of the 
value added chain which 





4.5 : Global Productivity and Per Capita Income Trends 
 
This last sub-section provides an assessment of global productivity trends which should be 
regarded as the most important indicator for evaluating the overall success or failure of the 
globalisation process for individual countries given its effects on the living standards of the 
developed world and on the income convergence ambitions of emerging economies. 
Globalisation-induced changes in specialisation patterns require sectoral adjustments in both 
the developed and emerging economies to ensure a mutually beneficial process. The success 
of this restructuring is ultimately reflected in productivity / real wage developments and 
consequently trends in the latter provide a summary indication of how the respective 
economies are responding / adjusting to globalisation. 
 
Table 3 shows that long run changes in per capita incomes are essentially driven by 
productivity trends. One can also see that the EU’s own catching-up process with the US over   56
the period since 1960 was driven by an annual average productivity growth rate differential of 
close to 1% point. Likewise, the EU must now expect a faster pace of efficiency gains in the 
rest of the world over the coming decades, as these countries restructure and upgrade their 
economies in their drive to converge towards the income levels of the developed world. 
Globalisation is an essential vehicle for this catching-up process to occur, with trade and 
capital market integration driving productivity growth via increases in capital accumulation 
and the diffusion of technological progress. Of course, for the EU to fully benefit from this 
process, it must also adapt to the changes in specialisation / comparative advantage being 
driven by this deepening in the integration process. In this context, increased global 
competition is potentially a powerful driver of productivity growth, acting as an incentive for 
firms to continuously enhance their underlying efficiency performances via process or 
product innovations (thereby differentiating themselves from their competitors in the global 
marketplace). 
 
TABLE 3 : AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (%) -1960-2003* 
  EMPLOYMENT P RODUCTIVITY GDP  POPULATION GDP PER 
CAPITA 
EU15  0.5 2.5 2.9 0.4 2.5 
US  1.7 1.6 3.4 1.1 2.2 
REST OF WORLD*  2.0 2.1 4.2 1.8 2.3 
WORLD*  1.9 1.8 3.7 1.7 2.0 
PRODUCTIVITY (PER PERSON EMPLOYED) GDP PER CAPITA   
1960-1990 1991-2003 1960-1990 1991-2003 
EU15  2.9 1.4 2.9 1.6 
US  1.5 1.8 2.4 1.8 
REST OF WORLD*  2.2 2.0 2.4 2.2 
(CHINA)   (6.1)  (6.6) 
(INDIA)   (3.9)  (3.9) 
WORLD*  1.9 1.6 2.1 1.8 
*For the “rest of the world” and world aggregates, only those countries where data is available for the whole period 1960-2003 are included. 
Source : GGDC Total Economy Database, UN, own estimates. 
 
On the basis of productivity trends over the 1990’s, how well has the EU been coping with 
this deepening of the global integration process and with the income and technological 
catching-up of the rest of the world ? As can be seen from table 3 and graph 22, productivity 
growth rates in the rest of the world have been on average about ½ a % point higher compared 
to the EU over the period 1991-2003. While catching-up would suggest that such a 
differential is to be expected, graph 22 worryingly indicates that the differential has been 
growing rapidly over the 1990’s, with the gap in 2003 at around 1 ½ % points. The US on the 
other hand has managed to boost its productivity growth rate over this period and to restrict 
the gap to less than ½ a % point, even over recent years. These trend labour productivity 
differences suggest that the EU is not responding effectively to the catching-up of the rest of 
the world, especially when one compares its performance with that of the US.  
 
As a recent paper by Denis et al. (2005) showed, part of the downturn in the EU’s 
productivity growth rate over this period reflects an outdated and inflexible EU industrial 
structure which has been slow to adapt to the intensifying pressures of globalisation and the   57
associated acceleration in technological progress. In addition, this latter paper stressed that 
while the US has also witnessed big negative effects from globalisation in a range of its 
traditional manufacturing sectors, it has nevertheless managed to turn around its productivity 
performance by focussing on the newer, leading edge, manufacturing sectors such as ICT and 
on a further development of a number of its service sectors. What is particularly disturbing 
about the EU’s post-1990 performance is that it has now, for the first time in the post-war 
period, a trend productivity growth rate which is lower than that of the US. This has occurred 
despite the fact that the EU's productivity levels are still less than 80% of those of the US 
(Graph 23). The EU is manifestly suffering from a premature halting, and indeed reversal, of 
its own secular convergence trend. 
 
Graph 22 : World Trend Labour Productivity Growth Rates : 1991-2003 


























Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and own calculations 
 
Graph 23 : World Trend Labour Productivity Levels : 1991-2003 













Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and own calculations 
 
With regard to the emerging economies (i.e. the "rest of world" grouping), according to Graph 
22, these countries are making big strides in terms of productivity growth rates, although of 
course in levels (graph 23) it is clear that the present positive growth rate differentials will 
need to persist for decades if incomes in these countries are to converge over time to those in 
the EU and the US. It can of course be argued that productivity trends in the ROW by 
themselves are not the result of technological convergence but are instead the outcome of 
higher investment rates. A big issue therefore is to get a clearer idea of the nature and extent 
of the technology shocks in the rest of the world in order to understand the present and 
expected future shifts in global production patterns. A knowledge of TFP developments is   58
crucial for identifying these region-specific technology shocks and for assessing the 
quantitative magnitude of worldwide technological convergence. 
 
Graphs 24-25 give a decomposition of labour productivity into its capital deepening and total 
factor productivity (TFP) components and indicate that the upward trend in productivity in the 
ROW is being driven by both of these factors but with TFP the most significant driver. Of the 
1 ½ % points increase in the rest of the world's trend labour productivity growth rate over the 
period 1991-2003, 80% of it came from an acceleration in TFP growth. In the case of the EU, 
the greatest share (over 70%) of the downward movement in labour productivity over the 
same period is due to a decline in TFP growth rates. This is a very important conclusion since 
TFP is widely regarded as the structural component of productivity growth
43, with significant 
divergences emerging between the efficiency performance of the EU and the rest of the world, 
especially since the mid-1990's
44.  It is also interesting to compare the performance of China 
with that of the RoW grouping as a whole. While China has also witnessed a sharp 
acceleration in its labour productivity growth rate, with the latter rising by 2 percentage points 
(from 4.6% to 6.6%) over the period 1991-2003, unlike the overall RoW grouping this 
acceleration is totally due to increased rates of capital deepening. While TFP growth rates are 
relatively high in China, they have been stable over the period at around 3%, with this trend 
again questioning the belief that China's recent productivity acceleration reflects domestically 
generated technological progress
45.    
 
Graphs 24-25 therefore tell us quite a bit about the nature of the productivity changes in the 
ROW. Whilst the efficiency gains in the grouping as a whole may reflect more than simply 
the absorption of technical progress from the developed world in the form of capital 
accumulation, this appears to be the sole factor explaining the 1991-2003 trend acceleration in 
China. In addition, while the RoW as a group may be producing new knowledge (i.e. new 
process or product innovations) which the whole world can gain from
46, it is not however 
possible to judge at this stage the extent to which this new knowledge is being derived from 
their own domestic R&D and human capital endowments or whether it mainly reflects the 
activities of foreign multinationals. If the ROW trends were simply an absorption story, the 
implications for the developed world would be less significant compared with a scenario 
where these countries are producing new knowledge via their own domestic innovation 
systems and converting this knowledge into a globally competitive industrial structure. The 
implications for the EU of different interpretations of these TFP trends in the ROW are 
explored in the simulations in section 5, in particular regarding their effects on terms of trade 








                                                 
43  Long run labour productivity grows broadly in line with labour augmenting technical progress i.e. TFP. 
44 As well as the short-term uncertainties related to the strength of consumer demand, the sluggishness of the investment recovery in the EU 
over recent years is partly related to this longer run structural deceleration in the pace of technical progress, with faster capital accumulation 
over the coming years dependant on trend improvements in TFP / employment growth. 
45 China's recent labour productivity growth appears to emanate from a massive accumulation of capital resources rather than from increasing 
efficiency. 
46 An example from the 1970’s and 1980’s would be the just-in-time technology introduced by Japanese manufacturers.   59
Graph 24 : World Trend Capital Deepening Growth Rates : 1991-2003 

























Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and own calculations 
 
Graph 25 : World Trend TFP Growth Rates : 1991-2003 



















 Note : China is also part of "Rest of World" grouping 
 Source : World Bank (World Development Indicators) and own calculations 
 
Globalisation and Productivity Trends
Productivity is the key indicator for assessing how economies are adjusting to the 
globalisation-induced changes in specialisation patterns
(Trend labour productivity in the EU is declining & rising in the US and the ROW – suggests 
EU is not responding effectively to the catching-up of the developing world)
Acceleration in labour 
productivity growth in 
developing world & US 
being driven by capital 
deepening & TFP (new 
knowledge*)
Acceleration in labour 
productivity growth in 
China only being driven 
by capital deepening
70% of deceleration in EU 
productivity growth being 




* It is not possible to judge whether the "new knowledge" is being derived from the developing world's 




To summarise, the evidence presented in section 4 does not permit a definitive conclusion 
regarding the overall benefits or costs of globalisation for the EU economy over the last 10-15 
years, with a final assessment only being possible on the basis of the general equilibrium 
simulations to be presented in section 5. Despite this uncertainty, it is fair to suggest that from 
the partial-equilibrium analysis in the present section that the overall trend for globalisation-
related EU indicators has been somewhat negative. This is particularly true for productivity, 
where TFP trends are pointing to a structural productivity problem in the EU. This TFP 
conclusion has clear implications for all of the other indicators covered, although lagged 
effects, and the particular nature of the catching-up process in the ROW, is perhaps clouding 
the outcome in certain areas, most notably regarding the EU's relatively favourable terms of 
trade and export performances.  On the assumption that the EU continues to be significantly 
underrepresented in the high technology export sectors (unlike the US and Japan) and that 
Asia progressively moves into areas of traditional comparative advantage for the EU in the 
medium-high technology segment of the market, it is reasonable to predict a medium to long 
run deterioration in both the EU’s overall pricing power and in its external trading position.  
The deteriorating TFP performance in the EU and the associated poor investment 
environment is also adding to the relatively high level of capital outflows and to the 
increasing evidence that our import penetration ratios are rising, with particularly high ratios 
for a number of important ICT products.  
 
1. PRODUCTION RELOCATION
Partial equilibrium analysis of 1991-2003 period suggests a mixed EU 
experience with globalisation (5 areas of analysis)
 Outsourcing gains
 Net FDI losses (nature + extent not 
problematic)
 Evidence in import penetration ratios of 
shift in preferences away from EU produced 
goods
2. TRADE INTEGRATION
 Relatively good EU trade performance but 
medium to long run risks are evident
3. R&D
 EU losing out to US as a location for 
internationally mobile, technology seeking, R&D 
expenditures
 Persistent EU deficits on its technology balance 
of payments compares with surpluses for US / 
Japan
4. TERMS OF TRADE 5. PRODUCTIVITY
 Terms of trade gains for EU relative to 
China / rest of world 
 However EU terms of trade gains are much 
less than those of the US
 EU trend productivity growth rate is 
declining compared with inceases in US & 
rest of world
 EU decline is structural and highlights the 
need for a productivity agenda
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Section 5 : Model based assessment of the macro benefits and costs of globalisation 
 
A successful globalisation strategy is predicated on allowing a reallocation of resources to 
take place within the respective economies. Many countries in Europe are presently placing, 
excessively heavy, restrictions on this process and consequently the indicator based evidence 
presented in section 4 has shown that the 1990’s have been characterised by, at best, small 
gains from globalisation and, at worst, small losses. With the public debate overwhelmingly 
focussing on the short run, potentially negative, aspects of globalisation, such as production 
relocation and the associated lower domestic investment levels, the positive medium to long 
run benefits of globalisation are in danger of being ignored or at least underestimated. Against 
this background, the present section will quantify, in a realistic manner, both the short run 
adjustment costs of globalisation as well as the longer run potential benefits in terms of higher 
productivity and GDP per capita growth rates. By doing so it will demonstrate that the present 
policy response to globalisation in many EU countries is not working, with this inappropriate 
policy reaction compromising the longer run health of their economies as well as that of the 
EU as a whole.  
 
5.1 : Main features of globalisation model  
 
Analysing the quantitative impact of globalisation is carried out using a variant of ECFIN’s 
international macro model (QUEST) and using the insights provided by section 4. The 
summary chart on the next page provides an overview of the modelling approach used to 
quantify the macroeconomic effects :  
 
•  Transmission Channels : The model has the capacity to assess both the static (i.e. 
shifts in comparative advantage / specialisation patterns of countries; gains in terms of 
economies of scale; and in the availability of new varieties of goods and services) and 
the dynamic (benefits in terms of increased import competition and from the 
dissemination of global technological advances) effects of globalisation. 
 
•  Modelling the specific features of the post-1990 globalisation phase : The model 
has been adapted in various ways in order to better capture the specific features of the 
post-1990 phase of globalisation. Firstly, an important feature which has been added is 
the consideration of imported intermediate inputs in domestic production. This is 
essential to better reflect the outsourcing phenomenon. Trade in final and intermediate 
goods and services is explicitly modelled via a CES preference and production 
structure which allows us to specify the varying degrees to which goods and services 
produced in different world regions are substitutable. Secondly, a consistent definition 
of price indices allows us to interpret changes in real consumption in welfare theoretic 
terms. Finally, based on recent empirical results in international trade, an attempt has 
also been made to model the link between technological change and demand shifts. 
 
•  Key target variables : The summary chart indicates that a large range of variables are 
focussed on in the simulations (investment, technological progress, FDI, terms of trade 
and export / import market share developments), with the most emphasis being placed 
on the effects of globalisation on productivity / standards of living. 
 
•  Simulations allow for the testing of different theories regarding the effects of the 
post-1990 globalisation phase : Given the conflicting views regarding globalisation, 
with credible arguments being put forward in both the optimistic and pessimistic   62
strands of the literature, it is important to evaluate the relative merits of the different 
hypotheses. This is done in the simulations, where 4 different views on the costs / 
benefits of globalisation are assessed before drawing any overall conclusions.  
 
Quantifying the Macro effects of  Globalisation  
1. Globalisation Transmission Channels
Static Effects of Globalisation 
(Specialisation + Economies of Scale + 
Increased Varieties)
Dynamic Effects of Globalisation
(Technological Spillovers + Import 
Competition)
2. Model Modifications made to handle specific aspects of the post-1990 Globalisation pattern
4. Static + Dynamic effects of the post-1990 upsurge in Globalisation are explored using four different 
interpretations of the changes in global production relocation patterns which have occurred 
3. Key Variables focussed on in Simulations




only relative prices 
not production 
structures) 
2. Change in Global Specialisation Patterns 
(Globalisation leads to changes in relative prices + production)
3. Pessimistic Interpretation 
of changes in specialisation 
patterns for the developed 
world
(Samuelson View) 
4. Optimistic Interpretation 
of changes in specialisation 
patterns
(Increased Varieties of 
Goods and Services)
Intermediates included in 
production function
(Needed to analyse 





(Needed to assess the 
welfare effects of new 




and demand shifts 
extensively explored
(Needed to evaluate the 
impact of growth rate 









Shares + Import 
Penetration 
Ratios
Productivity + GDP per capita (Living Standards)
 
 
It is worth stressing at the outset that quantifying the effects of globalisation at the 
macroeconomic level is a difficult task and that there are certainly limitations to a purely 
macroeconomic view of the globalisation phenomenon. The process of globalisation does not 
affect the economy in a uniform manner. It affects sectors and occupations to varying degrees. 
Not being able to identify the critical sectors and their interactions with the rest of the 
economy in a detailed way is a weakness of any macro analysis. Nevertheless a macro   63
approach offers many advantages. Sectoral studies are by definition partial in nature and they 
miss important economic feedback mechanisms. In contrast, international macro models such 
as QUEST allow for the consistent modelling of international trade and financial flows by 
considering equilibrating mechanisms, operating via adjustments in the terms of trade, which 
establish long run internal and external balance. In fact the quantitative analysis conducted in 
this section emphasises international capital flows, by looking at how they respond to 
globalisation related shocks and by further analysing repercussions on other important macro 
aggregates such as consumption, investment and productivity.  
 
5.2 : Quantifying the static and dynamic effects of globalisation 
 
5.2.1 : Simulations allow for 4 different interpretations of the macroeconomic effects of 
the post-1990 globalisation phase  
 
In order to conduct a meaningful analysis of globalisation it is important to first define what 
globalisation means in terms of quantifiable shocks hitting the world economy. Here we go 
back to our earlier definition of globalisation where we stated that the major impulse for the 
current globalisation phenomenon is a process of technological convergence in a number of 
emerging economies, mostly located in central and Eastern Europe, Asia and parts of central 
and Latin America. As discussed earlier, technical progress, defined as the growth rate of 
TFP, has been about ½ a percentage point higher in the RoW compared to the EU15 over the 
last decade, with the trend in recent years pointing to gaps of 1% or more. It is assumed in the 
simulations that the average 1991-2003 growth rate differential of ½% is likely to persist over 
the next 50 years and to gradually decline thereafter
47. 
 
As indicated earlier in the paper, one important element for assessing the spillover of 
technical progress from the RoW to the industrialised economies is the degree to which 
increased technological capacity in the RoW leads to changes in global production patterns. 
More specifically, to what extent will worldwide income and technological convergence lead 
to the relocation of production from one country to another for a range of goods and services. 
Consistent with the estimates of Gagnon (2004), bilateral imports of country i from country j 
are positively affected by the growth rate differentials between the two countries
48. The 
available estimates suggest that a growth rate differential between the catching-up country 
and world GDP growth of 1% shifts its imports by about ½ a percentage point (i.e. every 1 
percentage point growth differential is associated with a 0.5 percentage point shift in that 
countries demand for intermediate and final imports). An important question remains however 
: how does this affect the number / variety of goods and services produced in the 
                                                 
47 What is happening after 50 years is highly uncertain. However, whatever assumptions we make for the period after 2050 will not affect the 
results for the first 25 years very strongly. 
48 The available estimates suggest that the import demand shift in bilateral import equations can be represented as a function of the TFP 
growth rate differential between the exporting country j and the rest of the world. The derived parameter value gives the magnitude in which 
productivity changes in country j translate into import demand shifts in country i. In this context, most of the literature on empirical trade 
regressions refers to import demand in terms of final goods. Final goods refer to the demand for imported investment and consumption 
goods. There is however a second demand shift which the present analysis also considers, namely the demand for imported intermediates as 
inputs into the production processes of domestic industries. Like in the case of the demand for final goods, two aspects of intermediates must 
be distinguished. An increase in technology in the rest of the world increases the demand for intermediates, simply because this demand is 
price elastic. However a second effect could also be playing a role, especially since the early 1990’s. Over these years, technological and 
other developments (improved global communication systems; reductions in transport costs and tariffs; a larger share of goods being traded 
which have low transportation and handling costs, for example ICT goods and services) could have been biasing overall trade towards 
imported intermediates. These efficiency improvements in international production (in a wider sense) are also linked to TFP improvements in 
the rest of the world. Increasing trade integration drives these efficiency gains through the increased competition which the wider market 
generates and via the international division of labour (i.e. the specialisation by people and economies on what they do best). 
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industrialised economies ? From the perspective of the EU, at least four alternative global 
production relocation patterns can be distinguished : 
 
•  Global relocation pattern 1 (no change in specialisation) : Under this scenario, 
catching-up in the rest of the world does not fundamentally change the structure of 
traded goods and services. Rapid technical progress enables emerging economies to 
produce the goods they traditionally supplied to the world market at a lower cost. In 
this scenario, “relocation” only therefore takes the form of changes in relative prices 
whilst the pattern of international specialisation remains unchanged. 
   
•  Global relocation pattern 2 (change in specialisation)  : For this second scenario, it is 
assumed that technological progress in the rest of the world enables emerging market 
economies to produce goods and services which were formerly only produced in the 
more advanced countries. This causes firms in the industrialised economies, such as 
the EU, to exit the market or to move production abroad. Certain types of goods 
formerly produced domestically in the EU are replaced by imports. Consequently, 
technological convergence leads to shifts in relative demand. This process is modelled 
via a positive shift in the import demand equation for the EU and a negative shift in 
the demand for domestically produced goods. However, while there is a shift in the 
pattern of specialisation, the number of varieties of goods and services is not changed 
globally.  
 
•  Global relocation pattern 3 (pessimistic assessment of a change in specialisation : 
"Samuelson View")  : This scenario is a variant of pattern 2, with the only difference 
being that technical progress in the RoW is assumed not only to lead to the production 
of goods and services which directly compete with those of industrialised countries in 
world markets but in addition it leads to the substitution of imports in the RoW by 
domestic production. There is therefore a negative shift of import demand in the RoW 
associated with the positive demand shift towards domestically produced goods. This 
scenario is manifestly more negative for the EU compared with scenario 2, with 
import substitution in the ROW leading to reduced exports for the EU and to less 
favourable terms of trade effects. 
 
•  Global relocation pattern 4 (optimistic assessment of a change in specialisation) : 
This is also a variant of scenario 2 but this time the outcome is more favourable for the 
EU. The important difference with the earlier scenario is that the introduction of new 
goods and services by the RoW does not lead to a displacement of domestically 
produced EU goods and services. This scenario is an attempt to capture the gains for 
EU consumers and investors from an increased variety of intermediate and final goods 
and services
49. In this case the upward shift in the EU’s import demand equation is not 
accompanied by a downward shift for domestically produced EU goods and services.  
 
The overview of the simulation results presented in 5.2.2 explores the impact of globalisation 
under these four alternative scenarios. Obviously the “truth” will be found in a combination of 
all four patterns. Nevertheless it is useful to look at these extreme simple cases in order to see 
the range of possible outcomes. The simulations describe the main static and dynamic effects 
of globalisation on the EU and the rest of the world. The results have been presented as a 
                                                 
49 Scenario 4 admits that there is a shift in the demand for goods produced in the ROW. However these goods are not regarded as competing 
with goods produced in the EU/US but the ROW is adding new varieties which induces consumer benefits.    
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range of possible outcomes. This approach was adopted to reflect the high degree of 
uncertainty attaching to the long run evolution of a number of key GDP per capita 
determinants, such as import propensities; terms of trade; the investment climate in the EU; 
and the effects of higher levels of competition, restructuring and technological spillovers.  
 
In addition to technological convergence, another important globalisation feature which is 
emphasised in the simulations is the substantial liberalisation of international capital and trade 
flows since the beginning of the 1990s. Of course trade barriers due to distance 
(transportation costs) remain but these are largely symmetric.  
 
Finally, regarding the employment effects, it is assumed for all the simulations that wages 
adjust to keep the level of employment constant. While this is undoubtedly a simplification, it 
has the advantage of summarising the effects of globalisation on the labour market by a single 
indicator, namely real wages
50. With a standard wage equation in place in the model, the 
impact would have been split into wage and employment effects. Another way of looking at 
this convention is that it provides information on how much wages will have to adjust in order 
to keep employment constant. In most cases while real wages may need to adjust downwards 
in the short run, this is not the case over the longer run where gains are evident from the 
improvement in the terms of trade. This overall effect does not however make a distinction 
between skilled and unskilled workers and consequently no conclusions can be drawn in 
terms of the income distribution consequences of globalisation
51.  Future modifications to the 
model will hopefully make such an analysis possible. 
 
5.2.2 : Overview of Simulation Results  (see annex 2 for the detailed results) 
 
Three essential issues are addressed in the simulations : 
 
•  Firstly, from a backward looking perspective, we are interested in the extent to which 
the evolution of the main macroeconomic aggregates over the last 15 years have been 
influenced by the globalisation process and whether the EU has gained or lost from 
this process. The conflicting interpretations of recent globalisation trends reflects the 
fact that the catching-up process is driving big shifts in international production 
patterns and it is difficult to estimate the gains / losses from this process for the 
developed world. The key issue is whether the globalisation induced shifts in 
international production patterns are positive or not for the EU i.e. has the increase in 
outsourcing, offshoring and shifts in international demand patterns added to EU living 
standards or not. In effect the simulations are trying to quantify the trends discussed 
earlier in section 4; 
 
                                                 
50 What is the degree of real wage adjustment which is necessary at the macro level in order to ensure that there is no negative employment 
effect from globalisation. 
51 While not quantified, many studies suggest that a significant real wage adjustment will result for particular skill groups and sectors. If there 
is a decline in the demand for unskilled workers, this will manifest itself in either higher levels of structural unemployment / lower 
employment rates (in countries with inflexible labour markets) or in a decline in the relative wages of unskilled workers / increasing income 
differentials (in countries with more flexible labour markets). Trade liberalisation has in fact a similar economic effect to technological 
progress – it allows economies to consume more without any increase in their available resources by exporting what they don’t want and 
importing what they do. Also, like technological progress, trade liberalisation creates winners and losers but the evidence suggests that 
technological change is much more important in explaining income inequalities in a country since technology is stronger than trade in 
driving the demand for skilled labour. W. Cline (1999) estimated that technological progress was close to 5 times more powerful than trade 
integration in widening the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the US over the period 1973-1993. Technological change is clearly skill-
biased.   66
•  Secondly, from a forward looking perspective, the simulations attempt to establish 
how the European economy will be affected, on a no-policy-change basis, by a 
continuation of current globalisation patterns both in static and dynamic terms; and   
 
•  Finally, given the rise in protectionist sentiments in many developed economies, the 
globalisation model is used to look at the effects of an anti-globalisation scenario 
which is characterised by increased trade tariffs and a reduction in capital mobility. 
 
The model is used to examine these 3 issues and it does this by providing upper and lower 
bounds of globalisation-induced spillover effects for the EU economy, both in the short and 
long run. The simulations isolate the key transmission channels from globalisation to 
productivity and GDP per capita trends. The static effects of various hypotheses regarding 
import penetration and terms of trade movements have been underlined, as well as the 
beneficial effects of globalisation from greater product varieties and from the dynamic 
influences discussed earlier. These more dynamic effects would be expected to result in gains 
for the EU in terms of product upgradings (i.e. higher value added goods and services) and a 
recovery in TFP growth rates. Graph 26 and Table 4 give a summary of the range of outcomes 
which are possible from the different interpretations of the implications of present 
globalisation patterns. The results are presented in terms of the outturn for the EU’s GDP per 
capita performance.  The main points to be highlighted are as follows : 
  
•  Overall assessment of the static effects of globalisation on the EU : In purely static 
terms (i.e. simply allowing for first round effects), graph 26 shows that the post-1990 
globalisation phase, and the associated production relocation from EU15 countries to 
emerging market economies, has only had marginal effects over the period 1991-2003 
on the growth rate of EU living standards. If one assumes that the conventional trade 
and growth view holds (i.e. no change has occurred in the pattern of worldwide 
comparative advantage), then the growth rate effect over this period has been 
essentially zero (not shown in Graph 26 since the effects are so consistently close to 
the zero line). If, on the other hand, one assumes that globalisation has led to shifts in 
international specialisation patterns, the maximum negative effect would still only be 
of the order of 0.1 of a percentage point off the growth rate of EU living standards 
over the period 1991-2003. Even this negative impact is shown to be a short run 
adjustment effect, with the long run static impact of globalisation over the complete 
period 1991-2050 being roughly zero. In addition, the present relatively negative EU 
effects from the post-1990 globalisation patterns should be compared with the much 
more positive US experience with the catching-up processes of the EU and Japan in 
the post-WW2 period. A similar policy response to the catching-up processes of 
countries such as China and India could bring equivalently large gains to a number of 
EU member states. 
 
•  Has the EU lost or gained from global production relocation ? : Regarding the 
phenomenon of global production relocation, the present study shows that its 
macroeconomic effects are in fact relatively small. In the worst case scenario (i.e. the 
Samuelson view), the maximum negative effect would be -1.3% in 2015 on the level 
of EU GDP per capita which is equivalent to .05 off the EU’s annual average growth 
rate over this period. In addition, the effect in 2050 would be close to zero in growth 
rate terms. This is not of course in contradiction with the widespread popular view that 
production relocation is having significant sectoral and regional effects. It just stresses 
that the net effect of globalisation-induced changes in international production patterns   67
is extremely small for the EU as a whole, with any localised losses in specific sectors 
being offset by gains elsewhere in the EU’s economy. 
 
•  How does the interpretation of globalisation change if dynamic effects are taken 
into account in the simulations ? : If one allows for the possibility of more dynamic 
effects from globalisation in terms of restructuring from heightened competition levels 
and from technological spillovers from the rest of the world, the EU has the potential 
to achieve significant efficiency gains from the ongoing global convergence process 
and from the associated reallocation of productive resources. On the basis of the most 
optimistic scenario, the level of EU GDP per capita would increase by about 8% over 
the next 4-5 decades which is roughly equivalent to 0.2 on the annual average per 
capita income growth rate over this period. This is broadly equivalent to the expected 
impact from the EU’s single market programme. Such a scenario would also result in 
a 30% gain in income levels for the rest of the world, thereby ensuring a strong degree 
of catching-up for the emerging economies and a successful integration process for 
both developed and developing countries
52. Given that extra EU goods and services 
trade amounts to less than 18% of EU GDP, an annual growth rate effect of 0.2 
constitutes a significant gain, especially since the competitive environment in the EU 
is relatively intense due to the high degree of integration which has already been 
achieved. In absolute terms an 8% increase in per capita income levels amounts to a 
permanent annual gain in living standards of about €2000 in 2004 prices for every EU 
citizen (over €5000 per EU household)
53.   
 
•  Would a "fortress Europe" policy be a good option to pursue ? : Regarding the 
effects of actions to slow down or even reverse the trend towards greater global 
integration, the results of the simulations are unambiguously negative. All 3 anti-
globalisation scenarios described in Annex 2 show negative effects for the EU and the 
rest of the world, with the most pessimistic scenario suggesting that the level of living 
standards in the EU could be up to 5% lower. Consequently, while the protectionist 
route may appear initially alluring to politicians relative to the alternative of global 
competition, in the long run it is a policy which will be highly negative for EU citizens 
in terms of efficiency levels and overall welfare
54. Outward-oriented policies are 







                                                 
52  Immense productivity gains (and consequently real wage / income gains) are possible as a result of the increasing international division of 
labour. Globalisation is therefore good for global economic prosperity. The EU must introduce policies which ensure that we take our fair 
share of the gains to be distributed from integration. 
53 These gains can be enjoyed annually since trade and investment liberalisation and the lowering of transport and communication costs via 
technological progress permanently increase the national income level of countries. In addition, if the dynamic effects of heightened 
competition / R&D spillovers on innovation / reskilling of workers are taken into account greater global integration can permanently (i.e. for 
30-40 years) increase the rate of per capita income growth (i.e. a key idea of endogenous growth theory). 
54 Quote from A. Johnson, UK Trade and Industry Secretary, "The paradox of protectionism is that it destroys what it seeks to protect" 
(Financial Times, February 2006). Resorting to protectionism and trying to shield jobs and industries from international competition only 
reduces economic efficiency, income and employment opportunities in the long run. An anti-globalisation stance is therefore not tenable. The 
only credible way to react to the emergence of the developing world is to keep EU markets open and exposed to global competition (this is 
essential to force adjustment on companies / countries), whilst investing additional resources in skills and technology (which is essential to 
move up the value added chain).    68
 
 



























	 	 	 	 			 	















(Allows for Dynamic Effects)
"Samuelson" View
Gains from greater 
varieties of goods 
and services
Change in Specialisation 
Patterns
 
Source : Own calculations 
 
KEY SIMULATION RESULTS
Static -first round- effects of 
globalisation are small
(Not surprising given firstly the 
offsetting influences described in 
section 4 & secondly the fact that extra-
EU markets account for less than 18% of 
EU GDP)*
Real gains from globalisation are 
dynamic in nature 
(The restructuring / innovation induced 
by the increase in competition / 
technology spillover effects / skill 
transfers could provide permanent 
productivity / GDP per capita gains for 
EU citizens of 8%)
Transition costs of globalisation are 
small & once-off.
Long run gains of globalisation are large 
& permanent
Fortress Europe policy would 
economically be highly damaging both 
for the EU and developing economies
 
* Furthermore, future static gains for the EU and the US from shifting resources to take account of comparative advantages and to 
exploit economies of scale are modest given relatively similar technologies, factor endowments and consumer preferences in both 
geographical areas. Since the EU and the US are both close to the technology frontier, the most important long-term effect from a 
more integrated global market economy are the potential dynamic gains from the boost to innovation from heightened levels of 
competition and from access to new technologies. Greater levels of innovation leading to the development of productivity enhancing 
technologies has the potential to boost the long run growth rates of both economies.    69 
Table 4 : Overview of Simulations 
Main Outcome 
– GDP per 
capita level 
effect 




in the developing world) 
 
 




empirical evidence  
1990-2003 
Static (“First Round”) effects  
1  No change in 
specialisation 
•  Relative Price Effects : Catching-up of developing countries does not change the 






Terms of trade 
developments over 
1990-2003 seem to 
support this view 
2  Change in specialisation  •  Relative Demand Effects : Developing countries start to produce intermediate and final 
goods previously only produced by the developed economies such as the EU and the US. 
•  EU firms exit the market or move production abroad which leads to increases in import 
penetration levels  











Pessimistic assessment of 
change in specialisation 
 (Samuelson View) 
•  Import Substitution in Developing World : In addition to the production of goods and 
services which directly compete with EU and US products, developing countries start to 
substitute imports with domestic production 
•  Result : Lower exports from EU / US to these countries (i.e. reduced output) + less 






Little evidence over 
last 10-15 years to 
support this view 
2
b 
Optimistic assessment of 
change in specialisation 
(Varieties) 
•  New varieties : Introduction of new goods and services does not lead to a displacement of 





Gains here are 
difficult to measure 
(Problem : quality 
adjusted deflators) 
Dynamic Effects 
3  Benefits of globalisation go 
beyond the initial “first 
round” effects on 
consumers and firms, 
emanating from lower 
prices and a greater range  
of goods and services 
•  Competition : Globalisation has an impact on competition levels and therefore on price / 
cost mark-ups 
 
•  TFP Spillovers : Potential for higher levels of technological (i.e. TFP) diffusion 
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effects over 1990-
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(Productivity trend in 
EU is declining 
sharply as is the TFP 
trend) 
 


















Annex 1 :  Modelling the globalisation-induced relocation of production processes at 
a macroeconomic level 
 
 
Annex 2 :  Detailed simulation results 
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Annex 1 : Modelling the globalisation-induced relocation of production processes at 
a macroeconomic level 
 
There is substantial empirical evidence that technical progress occurring in a certain 
region goes along with changes in the structure of international production. Countries 
with above average rates of technical progress are expanding the menu of goods and 
services that they offer on the world market. In particular a technological innovation in an 
emerging economy can be such that an industrialised country can loose its comparative 
advantage for the production of certain goods, with the consequence that production 
moves from one country to another. The international switch of production locations is 
what we call “global relocation”. Notice, this is a more general concept than outsourcing 
or offshoring, since it applies to finished and intermediate goods. This annex shows how 
this process is modelled in the globalisation variant of the QUEST model which is used 
for the simulations in the present paper. 
 
QUEST, like any standard macro model uses a system of import demand equations that 
are a function of the aggregate demand for consumption, investment by households, firms 
and the government and the relative price of imports. This is the so called elasticities 
approach. A key assumption of the elasticities approach is that each country produces an 
aggregate commodity which is an imperfect substitute for goods (aggregates) produced in 
other countries. This assumption is often referred to as the Armington (1969) assumption. 
The one good assumption hides the fact that the aggregate itself is undergoing substantial 
structural changes, among them changing patterns of comparative advantage. This 
process can be modelled at an aggregate level if one properly defines the aggregate from 
an underlying structure of preferences over domestic and foreign varieties. Krugman 
(1979) was the first to start from a more disaggregated approach to modelling macro 
trade relationships. The CES utility function introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) has 
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be a utility function for the domestic economy (region r) defined over 
D N domestic and 
F N foreign varieties. The parameter σ  denotes the elasticity of substitution between the 
individual varieties
55. The parameter A denotes the home bias. Utility maximisation 
subject to a budget constraint allows us to derive aggregate demand functions for imports 
and for domestically produced goods :  
 
                                                 
55 The actual structure of preferences is slightly more complicated, especially if it allows for different elasticities of substitution (eos) 
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Aggregate demand for goods produced domestically (
D X ) and for imports (
F X ) are a 
function of aggregate demand, relative prices and product variety. By starting from 
individual commodities it can be seen that in contrast to the standard Armington 
specification, there is a third important factor, namely changes in the number of varieties 
which can explain variations in import demand and the demand for domestically 
produced goods. Assume that the world economy initially produces N goods. The subsets 
D N  and 
F N  are produced domestically and abroad. Now suppose that technical progress 
enables the foreign economy to also produce some of the 
D N  goods at a lower world 
market price, then the production location for these goods will change, 
F N  increases and 
D N  declines. At the aggregate level this leads to an upward shift in the import demand 
equation and a downward shift in the demand function for domestically produced goods. 
 
In the conventional view, changes in demand only occur as a response to relative price 
changes. The modern trade theory view allows for additional structural shifts due to the 
introduction of new goods in one region and thus allows for an additional globalisation 
channel, besides the relative price channel. Notice, shifts in the demand functions for 
domestic and imported goods will in general be associated with relative price changes. 
The new view allows us, however, to distinguish between the sources for price changes. 
In particular it distinguishes between cost changes across regions which are due to 
product innovations and cost changes due to other sources. For example, if the change in 
relative costs is due to relative shifts in labour supply but does not affect technological 
capacities, then only the conventional price channel would be operative. If relative costs 
are changing due to the introduction of new products then in general both the price 
channel and the variety channel would be operating simultaneously. 
 
This view on aggregate trade equations thus offers more possibilities to model the link 
between technical progress in individual regions and shifts in domestic and foreign 
demand components and thereby obtain a better macroeconomic representation of 
globalisation. There is indeed substantial factual evidence that empirically estimated 
shifts in import equations are related to product innovations in the exporting region. 
Shifts in import demand can be explained by growth differentials between the exporting 
and the importing region  (see Annex 3 and the literature cited there). In the empirical 
trade equations used in the QUEST model, the ‘shift terms’ are modelled as follows :  
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thereby establishing a link between changes in relative TFP and product innovations. In 
the scenarios presented in this paper, four production relocation patterns between the rest 
of the world (RoW) and the EU are distinguished. 
 
Relocation pattern 1 : Catching up in the RoW does not fundamentally change the 
structure of traded goods and services. Rapid technical progress essentially enables 
emerging economies to produce the goods they traditionally supply to the world market 
at lower cost. “Relocation” only occurs via relative price effects but the pattern of 
international specialisation remains unchanged. This is modelled by setting 
15 , , 0 ) ( ) ( EU RoW r F D r r = = =ψ ψ . 
 
Relocation pattern 2 : Technological progress in the rest of the world enables emerging 
market economies to produce goods which were formerly only produced in the current 
industrialised countries. This causes firms in the industrialised economies to exit the 
market. Certain types of goods formerly produced domestically are replaced by imports. 
This process is modelled via a positive shift in the import demand equation and a 
negative shift in the demand for domestically produced goods. There is a change in the 
pattern of specialisation. However, the number of varieties is not changed globally. This 
is modelled by setting  , 1 ) ( , 1 ) ( = = F D EU EU ψ ψ and .  0 ) ( , 0 ) ( = = F D RoW RoW ψ ψ . 
 
Relocation pattern 3 : The same as pattern 2 concerning the EU but in addition it is taken 
into account that technical progress in the RoW leads to import substitution by domestic 
production. There is a negative shift of import demand in the RoW associated with a 
positive shift in the demand for domestically produced goods. 
, 1 ) ( , 1 ) ( = = F D EU EU ψ ψ and .  1 ) ( , 1 ) ( = = F D RoW RoW ψ ψ . 
 
Relocation pattern 4 : This is similar to pattern 2, with the difference being that the 
introduction of new goods by the RoW does not lead to a displacement of domestically 
produced goods in the EU because the RoW introduces new goods. In this case the 
upward shift in the import demand equation is not accompanied by a downward shift in 
the demand for domestically produced EU goods and services. The parameter values 
characterising this pattern are given by  , 1 ) ( , 0 ) ( = = F D EU EU ψ ψ and . 
0 ) ( , 1 ) ( = = F D RoW RoW ψ ψ . 
 
The introduction of new goods to the world market adds an additional welfare gain, since 
preferences are characterised by a love of variety (σ >1). The quality change due to new 
goods is measured by a quality adjusted price index which is derived from the utility 
function. In the QUEST model, a consumption based price index P is defined 
consistently with the underlying CES preferences as the minimum expenditure for goods 
D
i X  and 
F




i X X X , given relative prices. The consumer price   74
index measures the least expenditure for 
D
i X  and 
F
i X  that buys a unit of the 
consumption index. How does the introduction of new goods change this index ? The 
price index is defined as follows : 
 
[]




) 1 ( ) 1 ( F F D D P N P N P . 
 
Under the assumption that consumers value the introduction of new goods ( 1 > σ ), an 
increase in the number of foreign goods ( 1 > ∆
F N ) lowers the price index, thus 
indicating a rise in the value of real consumption.   
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Annex 2 : Detailed simulation results
56 
 
The simulations try to provide answers to 3 key questions –  
 
•  What are the static effects of globalisation ? 
 
•  Does allowing for dynamic effects alter the fundamental conclusions concerning 
globalisation ? and  
 
•  Would the EU benefit from a shift towards anti-globalisation policies ? 
 
1. Static Analysis of Globalisation 
 
Static Analysis of Globalisation : What are the longer run implications for the EU of 
a persistence of the 1991-2003 trends ?  : Looking back at the last 10-15 years, the 
question can be posed whether the relatively strong growth in the RoW over this period 
has in total been rather beneficial or harmful for the EU’s economy. A priori a clear 
answer to this question cannot be given. On the one hand, it can be argued that growth in 
the RoW generated additional demand for EU exports. But this must be compared to the 
potentially increased levels of import penetration in the EU and the possibly detrimental 
effects from capital outflows. Could capital outflows in the last decade have contributed 
to lower EU15 investment rates and consequently could they have been a factor behind 
the slowdown in EU productivity growth ? Furthermore, can the observed growth 
divergences possibly explain the magnitude of the change in the terms of trade and 
import shares and how do these effects translate into the growth of consumption, 
investment and GDP as well as to changes in the trade balance ? Section 1.1 below 
assesses whether the first 2 “relocation” patterns described in Section 5 of the main text 
are compatible with the stylised facts of the post-1990 period, with 1.2. looking at 
pessimistic and optimistic variants of the second pattern (i.e. that a change has occurred 





                                                 
56 Static V Dynamic Gains : The specialisation inherent in the principle of comparative advantage has a positive effect on productivity 
via two channels :  
•  Firstly, static - level - effects (i.e. one-off efficiency improvements from the reallocation of domestic factors of production 
to their most productive uses) and 
•  Secondly, dynamic – growth rate – effects (i.e. on-going efficiency gains from two of the key drivers of productivity 
growth - namely competition and innovation – as well as from a more rapid access to, and diffusion of, new technologies). 
Trade and investment liberalisation stimulates the imitation and adoption of foreign technologies and the search for new, 
domestically generated, technologies via the innovation process.  
While relatively easy to define, in practice it is often difficult to differentiate between static and dynamic gains since the one-off gains 
from the re-allocation of resources do not appear instantaneously. In general, however, it is fair to conclude that the growth rate effects 
(i.e. via increased competition and innovation) are potentially more important than the efficiency / allocation effects. 
   76
1.1 : Are present globalisation trends leading to changes in international 
specialisation patterns or not – a review of the different viewpoints 
 
Simulation 1 : No change in specialisation patterns - the conventional trade and 
growth view (“relocation” pattern 1 – see description in Section 5 of main text): This 
first scenario is close to the conventional trade and growth view, based on the notion of 
comparative advantage / specialisation. According to this view of globalisation, growth in 
the ROW does not lead to a change in the pattern of international specialisation. In other 
words TFP growth in the ROW does not lead to a shift in demand in favour of this 
region, beyond the effect generated by the change in the terms of trade. Without a shift in 
preferences, the welfare effects (measured by private consumption) of an increase in 
foreign TFP are significantly larger. With a TFP growth rate differential of roughly 0.5%, 
Table 1 and Graph 1 show that after 50 years the level of output in the rest of the world 
has grown by nearly 30% relative to a technical baseline which assumes that no catching-
up occurs. Relative to the EU’s GDP per capita level, this would imply an increase from 
about 25% of the EU average at present to 55% in 2050.  
 
Concerning the EU itself, the long run output effect is slightly positive. However, there is 
an adjustment process, characterised by a period of investment falling below baseline 
levels, linked with the relocation of capital to the faster growing regions. The negative 
investment response peaks between 5 and 10 years after the initial shock where at its 
maximum its level is down by about 1%, i.e. the annual average growth rate of 
investment is reduced by about 0.1%. The real consumption wage recovers relatively 
quickly because of the terms of trade gains
57 and turns positive after 10 years despite the 
fact that productivity levels remain below baseline for much longer. Also consistent with 
recent economic developments in the EU, the relocation of capital to the rest of the world 
(ROW) has been associated with a positive trade balance effect over the 1990-2005 
period. Globalisation is associated with an increase in the import share for both final and 
intermediate goods (due to cheaper existing products) and with a small loss in the EU’s 
world export market share. Compared to the actual increase in the EU’s import share over 
this period, the model generated increase is on the low side and consequently the results 
may be on the optimistic side. 
 
In overall terms, under this scenario, the negative short run effects for the EU from 
production “relocation” slightly dominate the positive effects from increased world 
demand and from the improvement in the EU’s terms of trade. However, EU households 
benefit in the medium to long run in terms of improved terms of trade and from the 
higher interest income from abroad (from the earlier capital outflows). The increase in the 
terms of trade derives from the fact that the acceleration in productivity in the ROW, and 
the associated price declines, dominates the positive effects on prices from the shift in 
import demand towards goods produced in the ROW. As explained in the main text, this 
pattern is not inconsistent with the terms of trade developments as observed over the last 
15 years (see graph 19 in section 4).  
 
                                                 
57 The model uses quality adjusted price indices. Standard consumer deflators underestimate the degree of price declines due to 
increased import variety.   77
Table 1 : Simulation 1 – No shifts in international specialisation patterns 
(conventional trade and growth view) 
Effects on Rest of World 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.3  7.9  18.5  28.9 
Terms of Trade  0.8  -3.1  -8.7  -13.4 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 
0.0 -2.0 -5.0  -7.6 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -0.2  0.0  0.6 
Terms of Trade  -0.5  2.5  7.1  11.1 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 




0.0 1.5 3.7  5.6 
Investment   -0.7  -0.5  1.1  2.5 
Consumption -0.2 0.3  1.8 3.5 
Real  Consumption 
Wages 
-0.1 0.2 1.1 2.3 
Export Market Share  0.2  0.1  -0.4  -0.7 
Trade Balance  0.2  0.1  -0.3  -0.6 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
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Simulation 2 : A shift occurs in international specialisation patterns (“relocation” 
pattern 2) : In this scenario emerging market economies are expanding varieties and 
enter markets previously dominated by the EU. This scenario addresses fears that there 
may be an insufficient response from the EU to the challenge posed by emerging market 
economies by not moving strongly enough into the development and production of new 
products. These fears are fuelled by the apparent weakness of the EU economy to enter 
new high tech markets such as ICT for example. Can this scenario better characterise the 
last 15 years and if yes what would be the long run consequences for Europe ?  
 
This scenario attributes more of the observed decline in GDP, consumption and 
investment in the EU over the period 1990-2005 to globalisation. This adjustment pattern   78
to the ‘globalisation shock’ generated by the model is not inconsistent with the stylised 
facts on consumption, investment and the trade balance in the EU over the period 1991-
2003. The prospect of less capital deepening and consequently lower productivity growth 
has negative effects on labour income expectations and therefore on private consumption, 
which frontloads this effect. However, despite the more negative results from simulation 
2, it must be stressed that globalisation as such does not entirely explain the relative 
decline in the EU's GDP per capita growth rate over this period, with the annual growth 
rate being reduced by about .05% in the first 10 years, which is equivalent to less than 
25% of the actual relative decline. 
 
Concerning the terms of trade, whilst this scenario is broadly consistent with the observed 
developments since the early 1990s, the nature and extent of the gains are different to 
those of simulation 1. In simulation 1 it was assumed that the products in which the ROW 
holds a comparative advantage (e.g. production of ICT-related goods, consumer 
electronics and textiles
58) are sold at a lower price (i.e. the TFP gains in the ROW are 
reflected in cheaper products only). In simulation 2 it is assumed that the TFP gains are 
reflected in both cheaper products and in the introduction of new products by the ROW 
which are increasingly demanded by the developed world. A comparison of the results in 
tables 1 and 2 reflects these differences in the underlying assumptions, with a larger 
terms of trade gain in the pure TFP scenario (i.e. simulation 1) and an increase in the 
nominal import share which is significantly smaller than that of the present simulation.  
 
Table 2 : Simulation 2 – Shifts in international specialisation patterns 
Effects on Rest of World 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.3  8.1  18.8  29.2 
Terms of Trade  1.8  -1.2  -6.2  -10.2 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 
1.0 -0.5 -3.3  -5.6 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -0.5*  -0.3  0.2 
Terms of Trade  -1.1  1.1*  4.9  8.1 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 




0.0 4.2 9.0  13.0 
Investment   -1.5  -1.5  0.2  1.6 
Consumption -0.6 -0.1 1.6 3.4 
Real  Consumption 
Wages 
-0.2 -0.3 0.5 1.6 
Export Market Share  0.4  0.0  -0.7  -1.2 
Trade Balance  0.4  0.1  -0.5  -0.9 
 * The GDP per capita loss is greater than the terms of trade gain – consumers are gaining (higher consumer surplus) but EU 
production is being hit by higher import penetration rates and by negative effects on domestic investment. The expected redirection of 
investment towards the new sectors (services etc) and the knock-on employment effects are not yet evident for the EU and the 
question is why.  
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend. 
Source : Own calculations 
 
                                                 
58 For the ICT-related goods and consumer electronics, the comparative advantage of the ROW is in the labour intensive, final 
assembly, stages of production, with many of these operations controlled by foreign multinationals.   79
In overall terms, given that we are replicating developments for only the last 15 years, the 
results from simulations 1 and 2 unfortunately do not allow us to make a clear 
discrimination in favour of one view or the other. Both are broadly consistent with the 
stylised facts. However, even under the second scenario, it is clear that the EU economy 
could benefit from higher growth in the RoW, though to a smaller extent than under the 
traditional trade and growth view. Given the uncertainties involved, 1.2. goes on to look 
at two variants of simulation 2, with the objective of establishing the likely range of the 
overall effects. 
 
1.2 : Changes in international specialisation patterns – a pessimistic and optimistic 
interpretation for the EU 
 
Simulation 3 – A more pessimistic production relocation scenario (pattern 3) : One 
of the consistently positive features of scenarios 1 and 2 is that the EU continues to reap 
important benefits from an increase in its terms of trade. Though these two scenarios 
capture the movements of the terms of trade over the last decade quite well, their long run 
prediction (a permanent terms of trade improvement for the EU) is somewhat at odds 
with empirical evidence on the long term link between growth and the terms of trade for 
faster growing regions.  
 
The stylised facts over the last four decades in fact point in the direction that there is no 
systematic negative association between faster growth in a region and a loss of its terms 
of trade. This suggests that the “relocation” assumptions made in the first and second 
scenario could in fact be too optimistic. Therefore, in this scenario we adopt “relocation” 
pattern 3 (see section 5 of main text for details) where we allow for import substitution in 
the RoW. This scenario yields no long run improvement in the EU’s terms of trade. The 
negative EU investment impact is now much more persistent and the real wage outcome 
is much more negative reflecting the downward pressure on productivity. Despite this, 
the extent of the negativity should not be exaggerated. After 50 years GDP per capita is 
down by 1% in levels, with most of the reduction concentrated in the first 10-15 years. 
Even in this scenario the long run welfare effects (i.e. in terms of consumption) 
represented by an increase in per capita consumption is positive for the EU economy. 
This is because households benefit from increased interest income from their investments 
abroad. The most important conclusion to be drawn from this simulation is that relocation 
(defined as offshoring plus outsourcing
59 plus shifts in relative demand) is a relatively 
minor phenomenon, at least at the level of the EU’s macro economy. 
 
                                                 
59 Higher levels of outsourcing / offshoring : An additional simulation was carried out just to look at the international outsourcing / 
offshoring part of the overall production relocation effect (i.e. the “voluntary” part of relocation). This simulation looked at the impact 
of assuming that outsourcing / offshoring turns out to be a much bigger phenomenon than presently predicted. For this scenario, we 
assumed that it is twice as large as is simulation 2 (i.e. extra-EU intermediate imports of parts and components and of semi-finished 
goods increase their share of EU GDP by 3% points rather than the 1 ½% points assumed in simulation 3). The main results of this 
simulation relative to simulation 2 is that the negative investment impact is much more persistent and the real wage outcome is more 
negative. Although this type of production relocation has positive output effects, when one allows for the initial capital outflows and 
for the fact that a lot of the output is produced using imported inputs, the overall impact on living standards is negative.  Despite this, 
the extent of the negativity is not alarming. In terms of GDP per capita, a doubling in the levels of outsourcing compared with the 
earlier simulation is associated with a negative level effect of -0.2 in 2050 which if translated into growth rate terms is effectively 
zero. While this compares with a slightly positive effect of 0.2 in simulation 2, given that we are talking about levels over 50 years, a 
negative turnaround of 0.4 should not be considered significant.   80
Graph 2 : Macroeconomic Effects of a more pessimistic production relocation 
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Table 3 : More pessimistic relocation scenario (no terms of trade gains for the EU 
and smaller demand effects) 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -1.1  -1.2  -0.9 
Terms of Trade  -2.9  -2.7  -0.7  0.4 
Import Shares (Intermediate 
Goods and Services) 
0.0 3.2 7.0  9.8 
Trade balance   1.0  0.2  -1.1  -1.8 
Investment   -3.6  -4.3  -2.7  -1.6 
Consumption -1.4  -1.1  0.8  2.5 
Real Wages  -0.5  -1.5  -1.4  -0.9 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
 
Simulation 4 : A more optimistic production relocation scenario (pattern 4) : This 
scenario shows that the introduction of new goods from the ROW has the potential to 
significantly increase the long run welfare gains in the EU. This aspect, as we learned 
earlier, has been emphasised in the recent trade literature, where a lot of attention has 
been devoted to the two welfare consequences of increased trade for consumers, namely 
the fall in the price of existing goods and services and the introduction of new imported 
varieties of goods / services. As can be seen in table 4, when one allows for these types of 
variety effects, globalisation takes on a much more positive aspect. While the results with 
regard to the terms of trade and import share developments are broadly similar to 
simulation 2, there is a much more positive outturn in terms of investment and 
consumption. The positive consumption effect is more than double that of simulation 2, 
with the result that overall GDP per capita in 2050 is more clearly positive compared 
with the earlier results. Why are the results so positive in the long run ? The deflators for 
consumption and investment are quality (variety) adjusted, i.e. they fully take into   81
account the consumer and investor benefits from having increased choice. Traditional 
price indices would not properly take this effect into account (see Annex 1 for additional 
details).  
 
Table 4 : Potential effects from the introduction of new varieties of goods 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -0.3  0.5  1.6 
Terms of Trade  -1.1  0.9  4.3  7.1 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 
0.0 4.8  10.2  14.7 
Investment   -1.6  0.2  3.5  6.1 
Consumption -0.4 1.1  4.2 7.5 
Real Wages  -0.2  0.9  3.1  5.5 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
 
Overview of Simulations 1-4 : The above simulations stress the uncertainties regarding a 
static interpretation of globalisation patterns, with both interpretation 1 (no change in 
specialisation) and interpretation 2 (change in specialisation) both been consistent with 
the stylised facts of the post-1990 period. In addition, depending on what happens with 
regard to the terms of trade and import demand patterns, the income position of the EU 
could be more negative or positive. However, while this is undoubtedly true, simulations 
1 to 4 do provide a useful range against which to assess the different hypotheses, with the 
most negative scenario pointing to losses of about 1% in GDP per capita levels in 2050 
(i.e. 0.02 off the annual average growth rate over the coming decades) and with the most 
optimistic scenario pointing to permanent gains of 1.6% in levels (i.e. a gain of 0.03 in 
terms of growth rates). 
 
2 : Dynamic effects of globalisation  
 
In addition to the type of static effects discussed in the first section, many commentators 
rightly stress that the benefits of globalisation go far beyond these initial “first round” 
effects on consumers and firms, emanating from lower prices and a greater range of 
goods and services. Globalisation also offers the realistic prospect of higher levels of 
productivity and growth due to the restructuring induced by greater levels of competition 
and from the faster pace of worldwide technological change. 
 
Simulation 5  : Effect of globalisation in terms of competition : The effect of 
globalisation in terms of the emergence of new competitors or from the introduction of 
new products is likely to have an impact on competition levels and could therefore reduce 
price / cost mark-ups. Various economists have tested this hypothesis in recent years. Kee 
and Hoekman (2003), using international sectoral data, find that an increase of 10% in the 
ratio of imports to production lowers the mark-up by around 1 ½ percentage points (i.e 
the mark-up falls from an average of 12% to 10 ½%). Chen, Imbs and Scott (2004) find 
similar results for Europe based on Eurostat data and the BACH database. Boulhol (2005) 
estimates the import penetration effect, directly on the Lerner index (a measure of the   82
profitability of firms), using data from the OECD’s STAN sectoral database. He also 
finds similar results and estimates the reduction in mark-ups to be in the range of 3 to 4 
percentage points
60. The scenario presented in table 5 is run under the assumption that 
increased trade will increase competition and cause a decline in the mark up of 4 
percentage points. Concerning production relocation, a change in specialisation patterns 
is assumed and consequently the results can best be compared to those of the earlier 
simulation 2. The increase in competition lowers prices and increases the demand for  
labour and capital. This has especially beneficial effects for the real income of workers 
both directly and indirectly via higher investment.  
 
Table 5 : Potential effects from increased competition levels 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  0.1  1.1  2.5 
Terms of Trade  -1.1  1.1  4.9  8.2 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 
-0.6 3.8 9.1  13.4 
Investment   -1.0  1.7  6.0  8.3 
Consumption -0.7 -0.4 1.8 4.6 
Real Wages  -0.2  1.6  5.2  8.6 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
 
Simulation 6 : Potential for higher levels of technological diffusion : In addition to the 
competition effect, the last simulation in this section also allows for the potential benefits 
accruing from technological (i.e. TFP) spillovers from the rest of the world. A recent 
review of the literature on international technology diffusion (Keller, 2004) concluded 
that for “most countries, foreign sources of technology are of dominant importance (90 
percent or more) for productivity growth” and that substantial technology spillovers are 
associated with it (i.e. the use of foreign investment goods has productivity benefits over 
and above the direct capital deepening or absorption effect).  
 
For the purposes of the present simulation, it is assumed that about 25% of the 
technological advancement in the RoW spills over into the EU in terms of higher TFP 
growth. These spillover effects for the EU take the form of higher levels of innovation 
and positive reorganisation effects. Table 6 shows that when one correctly allows for the 
dynamic effects of increased openness both in terms of dynamically induced gains from 
technological diffusion and from the enhanced levels of competition described earlier in 
simulation 5, the long run welfare effects of globalisation are not only much larger but 
the short term losses are smaller and are of a shorter duration.  Graph 3 also makes the 
important point that the developing world and the EU are both big winners from 
globalisation under this scenario. In terms of GDP per capita, the level of income in the 
developing world rises by over 30% compared with a gain of 8% for the EU. In growth 
                                                 
60 An increase in the import penetration ratio (i.e. measured as imports as a share of domestic demand) by 10 percentage points lowers 
the Lerner index by 3-4 percentage points.   83
rate terms, an 8% level effect translates into an annual average gain in EU living 
standards of roughly 0.2 each year up to 2050.  
 
Table 6 : Potential dynamic effects (increased competition and technological 
diffusion) 
Effects on EU
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.1  1.8  4.8  8.0 
Terms of Trade  -0.9  0.8  3.7  6.0 
Import Shares (Final 
Goods and Services) 
0.0 3.4 7.3  10.5 
Investment   -1.1  3.1  8.5  12.2 
Consumption -0.3 1.5  5.4 9.7 
Real Wages  -0.1  2.6  7.1  11.5 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
 


















% deviation in levels from technical baseline 
EU GDP per capita
Rest of World 
GDP per capita
 Source : Own calculations 
 
3 : Anti-globalisation scenarios (Static and dynamic effects)  
 
Despite the fact that the benefits of globalisation are widely accepted, the extent and 
nature of the present phase is understandably causing concern amongst politicians and 
policy makers regarding its ultimate impact on developed economies. While the 
simulations described in the first and second sections would suggest that at the macro 
level these concerns are groundless, the regional and sectoral impacts could nevertheless 
be considerable as countries strive to restructure their economies in response to the 
intensification in global competition levels. Given this charged political environment it 
was felt appropriate to look at the possibility of not only slowing down the process of 
globalisation but in fact of reversing it via the imposition of increased levels of tariffs and 
the re-introduction of capital controls.  In the three simulations described below the static 
and dynamic effects of reversals to the present integration trend are analysed, with the 
first simulation looking at the purely “first round” effects; the second simulation   84
examining the implications in terms of reduced levels of competition; and the final 
simulation assessing the additional impact in terms of technology spillovers. 
 
Simulation 7 : Static effects of anti-globalisation policy measures : For this 
simulation, a 10 percentage points increase in tariff levels is imposed which essentially 
brings us back to the average tariff levels pertaining in the 1960’s (see Williamson 2004). 
In addition, it is assumed that FDI as a share of world GDP is reduced to half its present 
levels. The pure trade effects of the tariff increases are in fact relatively small. They can 
be compared to the Krugman (1990) estimate of a 50% reduction in international trade 
yielding a loss in worldwide per capita income of 2.5%. These effects are offset in the 
developed economies by the reduction in capital outflows, with the overall GDP per 
capita effect in the EU being less than 1% in terms of levels (consistent with a contraction 
in world trade of about 20%). 
 
Table 7 : Anti-Globalisation Scenario - Static Effects 
Effects on Rest of World 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -0.3  -0.4  -0.5 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -0.6  -0.8  -0.9 
Investment   -1.2  -2.5  -2.4  -2.4 
Consumption 0.3 0.1 -0.3  -0.4 
Real Wages  -1.5  -2.0  -2.3  -2.5 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
 
Simulation 8 : Effects due to reduced product market competition associated with 
less trade : As discussed earlier, the link between trade intensity and goods market 
competition is an actively researched relationship. Applying the estimates quoted earlier 
(Kee and Hoekman etc) to the reduction in trade intensity implied by increased tariffs, 
yields a reduction in GDP per capita of  about 3 ¼% in 2050. 
 
Table 8 : Anti-Globalisation Scenario – Impact of static effects + reduced 
competition 
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -1.1  -2.3  -3.3 
Investment   -1.7  -5.8  -8.0  -8.8 
Consumption 0.5 0.3 -0.6  -1.6 
Real Wages  -1.5  -3.9  -6.8  -9.0 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
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Simulation 9 : Static + Competition + Technology Diffusion Effects : The final 
simulation takes into account the main potential channels via which increased tariffs and 
reductions in FDI flows can impact the EU and world economies. Regarding the effects 
of technology diffusion, as explained earlier, international technology trends play an 
important role in the economic development of countries. Various studies (e.g. Helpman 
and Coe (1995); Keller (2004)) conclude that for larger countries, about a quarter of 
domestic TFP growth is imported from abroad, with much higher levels for smaller 
economies. Using this estimate, a reduction in trade could lead to a significant slowdown 
in technical progress around the world.  Applying the same technology diffusion effects 
as in simulation 6 implies that a 10% reduction in trade would lead to a reduction in 
worldwide TFP (i.e. knowledge) of about 3%.  If one combines the technology, 
competition and initial static effects, table 9 and graph 4 show a substantial negative 
impact on living standards in the EU and the ROW, of the order of 5% in levels, roughly 
0.1 in growth rate terms. These simulations confirm that the EU’s present standard of 
living depends to a significant extent on the efficiency gains achieved via the global 
trading system. 
 
Table 9 : Anti-Globalisation Scenario – Static + Competition + Diffusion Effects  
Effects on EU 
  1991 2005 2025  2050 
GDP per capita  0.0  -1.6  -3.5  -5.1 
Investment   -1.6  -6.5  -9.5  -10.7 
Consumption 0.4 -0.2  -1.7  -3.4 
Real Wages  -1.5  -4.4  -8.0  -10.7 
Note : All variables are expressed as % deviations from a baseline with a common technology trend 
Source : Own calculations 
 
Graph 4 : Anti-globalisation scenario : Incorporation of Static + Competition + 
Diffusion Effects 
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Source : Own calculations 
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Overview of Simulation Results : The overall conclusion of the above simulations is 
that the EU is presently not reaping the potential benefits from globalisation. Our 
productivity growth rates are declining as the inadequacies of our production structures 
are increasingly exposed. Some policy makers are wrongly attributing the EU’s problems 
to global relocation forces (i.e. outsourcing, offshoring and shifts in worldwide demand 
patterns). This belief is not supported by the simulations in the present paper which 
conclude that for the most pessimistic relocation assumption, that when all the static 
effects are taken into account, the effect on the long run growth rate of EU living 
standards is essentially zero. In addition, these are essentially transition costs. When the 
dynamic benefits of relocation are taken into account, the EU could see per capita growth 
rates boosted by up to 0.2% points annually over the coming decades.  
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Table 10 : Overview of Simulation Results : Effects on EU GDP per capita; Terms of Trade; Import Shares;  





IMPORT SHARES E XPORT SHARES I NVESTMENT C ONSUMPTION R EAL WAGES   
2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005  2050 2005 2050 
STATIC EFFECTS OF GLOBALISATION 
1. NO CHANGE IN 
SPECIALISATION 
-0.2 0.6 2.5  11.1  1.5 6.1 0.1 -0.7  -0.5 2.5 0.3  3.5 0.2 2.3 
2. CHANGE IN 
SPECIALISATION 
-0.5 0.2 1.1 8.1 3.8  13.4  0.0 -1.2  -1.5 1.6 -0.1 3.4 -0.3 1.6 





























































DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF GLOBALISATION 















































































Source : Own calculations 
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S TATIC- FIRST ROUND - EFFECTS D YNAMIC EFFECTS




















Gains of up to 8% on the level of EU GDP 
per capita in 2050 
(0.2 on annual growth rate – similar gains 
as for EU’s Single Market Programme)
(Permanent, annual, gain of €800 billion 
for EU)
(€2000 per person - €5000 per household)
(Real wages for EU workers over 20% 
higher compared with anti-globalisation 
scenario)
Effects in simulations range from -1% to 
+1.6% on the level of GDP per capita in 






Large terms of 
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developed 
economies 
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transfer of 
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the rest of the 
world)
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Annex 3 : Trade regressions 
 
Trade amongst countries has further intensified over the last 10-15 years. Of course increased 
trade integration is not a new phenomenon - it has been observed for decades. However the 
period since 1990 is generally seen as a new era, both politically (fall of the iron curtain), 
economically (rapid convergence of several regions in the world, increased international 
capital mobility, outsourcing) and technologically (reduction in transport and communication 
costs, emergence of new goods and services, such as ICT, which can be traded more easily). 
How are individual regions performing in this new era ? Can these developments explain 
shifts in import and export equations ? Or should we rather regard trade integration as a fairly 
uniform process affecting all regions about equally ? In the EU context an important trade 
related question is the following : how does international trade transmit higher growth in the 
RoW to the EU economy. Are trade relations such that higher growth abroad is transmitted 
positively to the EU or is the opposite the case ?  
 
In order to analyse this question we set up a system of bilateral trade equations defined over 
10 regions of the world (EU15, EU10, EU-Neighbours
61, China, South East Asia
62, Japan, 
India, US, Rest of Americas
63, Rest of World). International trade can best be characterised by 
a system of bilateral import demand equations (exports of region j can be derived by 
aggregating the bilateral imports of regions i with j). Standard trade theory derives imports 
from CES preferences defined over goods produced in different regions. In other words, it is 
assumed that goods produced in individual regions are imperfect substitutes. The degree of 
substitutability can be measured by the price elasticity of imports (σ ). It is usually assumed 
that there is a unit income elasticity for imports. Under these assumptions the nominal share 
of imports of country i from country j ( jit simy ) can be written as a function of the terms of 
trade  
 (1) 




















This is also known as the Armington (1969) equation. The variable  jit s  is regarded as largely 
determined by exogenous factors, especially trade costs (transportation costs approximated by 
distance, tariffs etc). Therefore the above model is sometimes denoted as the gravity model. 
 
Is this model, which represents the standard view on trade, sufficient to explain international 
trade since the beginning of the 1990s? If it were, one could possibly draw far reaching 
conclusions concerning the welfare implications of fast growing regions for slow growing 
regions. The most important implication of the conventional trade model is that fast growing 
countries can experience rapid export growth only to the extent that they accept declining 
terms of trade. This is the most important mechanism through which fast growth in foreign 
regions generate welfare gains for domestic (e.g. EU) households. However, it is often argued 
that the observed relationship between the terms of trade declines of the exporter and export 
growth is weaker than implied by the standard trade model. The question therefore arises 
                                                 
61 Includes North Africa, the Middle East, non-EU central and eastern Europe, Turkey, countries of the ex-USSR, Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland. 
62 All of South East Asia (excl. China) plus Australia and New Zealand. 
63 All of North and South America and the Caribbean (excl. the US).   90
whether other factors besides the terms of trade could possibly explain movements in trade 
shares.  
 
Krugman (1988) provided the most prominent challenge to the standard model. In theoretical 
models pioneered by Helpman and Krugman (1985) a more refined link between 
growth/technical progress of the exporter and export performance (import demand shifts for 
imports from the exporter) has been established. They allow for quality changes of 
exportables. This is an important aspect that has been added. Conventional trade models, such 
as the Armington model, present essentially a static view of the theory of comparative 
advantage, where individual countries specialize in certain product categories. Technical 
progress only leads to a further refinement in the production of these goods. In other words, 
technical progress in country j does not threaten country i, since it stays within its traditional 
product line. However, this is not the only direction technical progress can take. It can very 
well be the case that technical progress is enabling country j to produce goods where country i 
used to have a comparative advantage. For example, China starting to produce cars could be a 
case, not adequately captured by the traditional trade model. Recently Gagnon (2004) has 
shown how the Armington model can be modified in order to incorporate product innovations 
of the exporting region. Essentially he suggests to add the relative GDP growth rate between 
the exporter and importer to the standard import determinants and he finds strong evidence for 
the significance of this variable.  
 
This aspect is especially important for the EU15 which suffered from a relatively weak 
growth performance in recent years. The question would be, has faster growth in the RoW 
acted as a locomotive for Europe, i.e. would growth in the EU have been even worse without 
faster growth abroad or has faster growth in the RoW made things worse via increased 
pressure on imports.  
 
Another important globalisation phenomenon has been the rising importance of FDI. This 
could itself have been an important factor shifting bilateral import shares. Various hypotheses 
can be formulated:  
•  Hypothesis 1 : FDI outflows serve to better supply the destination country with 
domestic goods (and to a lesser extent services), e.g. by setting up a distribution 
network. In this case one would expect that FDI inflows increase imports, i.e. FDI 
inflows into country i lead to an increase in imports into the same region.  
•  Hypothesis 2: FDI outflows are a substitute for exports, i.e. production is moved to the 
importing region. In this case one would expect that FDI inflows into region i lower 
imports of that region from country j.  
•  Hypothesis 3: FDI outflows are a substitute for domestic production (outsourcing) and 
they are not predominantly used for supplying the foreign market directly. In this case 
one would expect FDI outflows of country i to country j to be positively related to an 
increase in the import share of country j in imports of country i.    
Using a complete set of bilateral import equations for the 10 regions, covering the whole 
world economy and using annual data over the period 1992 to 2002, we test both the 
Krugman-Gagnon hypothesis as well as the link between FDI and trade. Our empirical model 
is given by the following equation 
jit ijt jit it jt it
it
jt
ij jit u FDI c FDI c Y Y c POP c
PM
P
c DIST c simy + + + + + + = 6 5 4 3 2
2
1 ) / ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(    91
It includes the basic variables from the gravity model (the geographical closeness of countries 
is still an important explanatory factor for trade flows). The trade intensity between region i 
and j is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between regional centres (
2
ijt DIST ) 
which serves as a proxy for trade costs and other remoteness factors. Another important factor 
for the magnitude of the import share is the size of the importing region, with smaller 
economies typically showing larger openness. The size of the population of the importing 
region ( it POP ) controls for the size effect. The relative price term ( it jt PM P ), defined as the 
GDP deflator of the exporting economy to the average import price in the importing economy 
represents the terms of trade effect. Note that a zero coefficient for the terms of trade would 
indicate a price elasticity of imports equal to one
64. As additional explanatory variables we 
include the relative growth between the exporting and the importing region in order to test the 
Krugman-Gagnon hypothesis and we include two FDI indicators, namely the stock of FDI 
capital of country j in country i ( jit FDI ) and the stock of FDI capital of country i in country j 
( ijt FDI ) in order to shed some light on the link between FDI and trade across regions. 
 
Table 1 :   Bilateral Trade Regressions Results 
  Gravity Model  Krugman-
Gagnon 
Model 
FDI and Trade 
Geographical Distance²(ij)  -1.0 (***)  -1.0 (***)  -1.0 (***)  
Terms of Trade (ij)  ( σ ) (Relative Prices)  -1.41 (ns)  -1.32 (ns)   -1.28 (ns)  
Population Size (i)  -2.8 (*)  -3.1 (*)  -2.1 (*) 
Growth Rate Differential Y(j)/Y(i)  (Relative Demand) 
Low Tech - Share(j) 
High Tech -Share(j) 
  1.9 (**)   
-0.18 (ns) 
0.24***  
1.4 (*)   
-0.10 (ns) 
0.091*  
Foreign Direct Investment Stock (j,i) 
Foreign Direct Investment  Stock (i,j) 
  ( n s )  
EU10, EU-Neighbours, 
Rest of Asia, China 
(***) India (*) 
  R² = 83.9% 
784 obs. 
R² = 84.9%   
784 obs. 
R² = 88.5%     
784 obs. 
(***),(**),(*): significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, (ns): not significant 
Source : Own calculations 
 
As shown in Table 1, the following results emerge from these regressions  : 
•  Firstly, the conventional determinants of trade flows, namely relative prices and trade 
costs (here approximated by distance between trading partners) still play an important 
role in shaping international trade. The price elasticity is larger than one. 
•  Secondly, the Krugman hypothesis which warns about the overwhelmingly positive 
effect which faster growing regions can have on slow growing regions (e.g. China on 
Japan) finds some support in the data.  Furthermore, countries with a large share of high 
tech industries seem to have a better export performance. 
•  Finally, concerning the link between FDI and trade we find some evidence that the 
stock of FDI from the importing country i to the exporting country j increases imports 
from j. This holds especially for j = EU10, Rest of America, China and India. This 
provides some evidence for the outsourcing phenomenon (hypothesis 3). 
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